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1. Introduction 
The transformation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to private firms has been among 
the most important economic events in recent times. SOEs are generally considered as ineffi-
cient and in the past 20 years, privatization has been the approach to their reform in more 
than 100 countries, including many Western countries such as the U.K., France and Canada, 
as well as Eastern Bloc countries and China. Privatization transforms a state-owned company 
to a privately owned one. A key outcome of this process is that the nature of the contractual 
relationships between owners and managers changes following the change in ownership. The 
main problem with SOEs is incentive and the contractual approach has been recognized as the 
main mechanism addressing this problem.  
This paper focuses on contractual relationships. We analyze the advantages and disad-
vantages of private ownership versus state ownership under various circumstances within the 
same model setting. We shed light on privatization from a unique angle by focusing on three 
aspects: external risks, internal governance, and the relative importance of owners versus 
managers. We also present empirical evidence in support of our theoretical findings. 
The contractual relationships we focus on are based on the ownership structure of a com-
pany. One key characteristic of private ownership is profit maximization, as opposed to social 
welfare maximization. One key characteristic of state ownership is the political doctrine of 
equal pay for all. However, over the years, the system of equal pay has suffered from severe 
incentive problems. Consequently, this system was adjusted to allow for bonuses, which im-
plies a conditional fixed contract. A conditional fixed contract offers a fixed pay with a bonus, 
where the bonus is conditional on a performance target. We impose two key assumptions in 
our model. Under private ownership, (a) the firm is privately owned and the owner maximizes 
profits and (b) any contract is admissible. In contrast, under state ownership, (a) the firm is 
state-owned and the owner maximizes social welfare and (b) only conditional fixed contracts 
are admissible. The firm faces the same conditions in either ownership arrangement, includ-
ing the same incentive problems, external risks and internal corruption. It turns out that 
neither ownership arrangement completely dominates the other in terms of economic efficien-
cy. The question is which arrangement is better under what conditions. 
We make the following theoretical findings. First, if the business environment is fairly 
risky, the market solution is always better than the planning solution. Second, if the role of the 
manager is important, the market solution is better. Third, if corruption can be effectively 
controlled, the market solution is better. Finally, if a safer environment is coupled with more 
effective control of corruption, the market solution is better. These results are new to the 
literature.  
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One key advantage of the planning solution is that the planner’s objective is aligned with 
the efficiency criterion (social welfare maximization); but one key disadvantage is that the 
planning solution offers weak incentives to economic agents. On the other hand, one key 
advantage of the market solution is that it offers strong incentives to economic agents; but one 
key disadvantage of the market solution is that private firms’ objective (profit maximization) is 
not aligned with the efficiency criterion. Economic agents are much more willing to work hard 
in good times. Hence, if a good time is very likely, the advantage in objective alignment over-
weighs the disadvantage in weak incentives so that the planning solution is better than the 
market solution. However, under normal circumstances as described in our findings, the 
market solution is better. 
Using a database containing 1,046 listed firms in the Chinese stock markets, including 
Chinese SOEs, privately owned firms and foreign firms, we empirically investigate the change 
in firm value before and after the announcement of privatization. We compare the same com-
panies before and after the announcement of privatization across time; we also compare dif-
ferent companies under different forms of ownership at a given time. In our regression model, 
we include the three key factors in our theoretical model (internal governance, external risks, 
and the relative importance of the owner) as independent variables. We make the following 
empirical findings. First, we find that the three factors are significantly associated with firm 
value and these associations are consistent with our theoretical predictions. Specifically, firm 
value increases with the strength of internal governance and the relative importance of the 
manager, and decreases with the degree of external risks. Second, the magnitude of the in-
crease in firm value after the announcement of privatization is determined by the three factors 
as well. Specifically, better internal governance, greater external risk or higher importance of 
the manager will magnify the benefits of privatization. To our knowledge, these findings are 
new to the literature.  
Privatization has become a hot topic in the literature. Researchers have looked at various 
aspects of privatization (see the surveys by Megginson & Netter (2001), Bonin & Wachtel 
(2003) and Turhan (2005)). Most studies claim that SOEs are inefficient and try to find rea-
sons for the inefficiency. Ehrlich et al. (1994) show that private ownership leads to higher 
productivity growth in the long run, but that the ownership effect is ambiguous in the short-
run. Bai et al. (2000) stress the role of SOEs in providing social safety, which reduces profita-
bility. Sun & Tong (2003) find that privatization is effective in improving SOEs’ earnings 
ability, real sales, and workers’ productivity, but fails to boost profit returns and leverage. 
Gupta (2005) finds that partial privatization has a positive impact on profitability, productivi-
ty, and investment in Indian SOEs. Bai & Xu (2005) consider multiple tasks of SOEs and try to 
disentangle the complementarity from the substitutability of incentives. D’Souza et al. (2005) 
show that ownership (both private and foreign), the degree of economic freedom, and the level 
of capital market development significantly affect post-privatization performance. Boubakri et 
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al. (2005a) find that the relinquishment of control by the government is a key determinant of 
profitability, efficiency gains and output increases. Recently, Jiang & Wang (2012) analyze a 
market-oriented, multistage privatization process and show that the lockup effect, demand 
elasticity, growth potential and business fluctuations can all affect staged privatization. 
On the contrary, some studies have suggested that state ownership is not necessarily less 
efficient than private ownership. Caves & Christensen (1980) study two major Canadian rail-
roads under different ownership structures; they do not find state ownership to be less effi-
cient than private ownership. Vernon-Wortzel & Wortzel (1989) suggest that SOEs perform 
better than private enterprises. Martin & Parker (1995) examine 11 U.K. firms that were pri-
vatized in the 1980s; they do not find evidence that private ownership is unequivocally more 
efficient than nationalization. Chang & Singh (1997) argue that SOEs and large private firms 
both face the same unwieldy bureaucracies. Since private firms have no inherent advantages 
in corporate governance, there is no guarantee that they are more efficient than SOEs. Kole & 
Mulherin (1997) study a sample of US companies; they find that the SOEs did not deliver a 
significantly different performance than private firms in the same industry. In a cost-benefit 
analysis, Schmitz (2000) identifies conditions under which private ownership, state owner-
ship or partial ownership is optimal. Finally, Aussenegg & Jelic (2006) examine the operating 
performance of companies privatized in three central European transition economies between 
1990 and 1998. They find that, in the first six years after privatization, the firms experienced a 
drop in profitability, capital investments, employment, and output as well as a significant 
increase in leverage. Their results indicate the importance of an appropriate legal and institu-
tional environment for the performance of newly privatized firms in transition economies. 
The existing theoretical studies on privatization typically attribute the inefficiency of 
SOEs to a government that does not maximize social welfare or the failure of the political 
system.4 For example, Perotti (1995) assumes that the government maximizes its revenue and 
partial privatization serves as a signal from the government. Bai et al. (2000) and Bai & Xu 
(2005) propose a multitask agency theory for the inefficiency of SOEs. Bai et al. (2000) as-
sume that SOEs are always less efficient than private firms, whereas Bai & Xu (2005) assume 
that the government maximizes its revenue and they restrict admissible contracts to linear 
contracts only. In contrast, we provide an ownership-based contractual theory with a govern-
ment that maximizes social welfare. We use a general social welfare function, allowing for 
various weights of social welfare on firm value and the manager’s payoff.  
Our model is unique. Instead of arguing that one form of ownership is always better than 
the other, we show that each can dominate under the right circumstances. We also provide 
empirical evidence supporting our theoretical predictions. Our theory suggests that a gradual 
                                                        
4 E.g., Jones (1985), Sappington & Stiglitz (1987), Vickers & Yarrow (1988), Shleifer & Vishny (1994), Perotti 
(1995), and Shleifer (1998). 
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reform process may be better than a one-time reform. As the business environment evolves 
over time, state ownership is gradually replaced by private ownership in the context of reform. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our theoretical model. Section 3 
presents the contractual relationship between the owner and the manager in a market econo-
my. Section 4 presents the contractual relationship between the owner and the manager under 
central planning. Section 5 analyses and compares the two contractual relationships. We find 
conditions under which the market solution is better than the planning solution, and vice 
versa. Section 6 presents an empirical study and the results. Finally, Section 7 concludes this 
paper with a summary and remarks. All the proofs are given in the Appendix. 
2. The Model 
Consider a company that may be state or privately owned. We investigate the contractual 
relationships between the owner and the manager in the two ownership environments. The 
relationships are defined by a principal-agent model, in which the owner is the principal and 
the manager is the agent. 
Besides ownership, risks in the business environment (external risk) and integrity of in-
ternal governance (corruption/stealing) are two important aspects in the relationships. We 
use output uncertainty to represent external risk. Specifically, let output be  
 ?̃? = 𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀̃, (1) 
where 𝑎 ≥ 0 is the manager’s action/effort, 𝑏 ≥ 0 is the owner’s action/effort, 𝜀̃ is a random 
shock with mean 𝜀̅ ≡ 𝐸(𝜀̃), and 𝑓:ℝ+
2 → ℝ is the production function. The random shock 𝜀̃ and 
actions 𝑎 and 𝑏 are not contractable/verifiable. Let 𝑐(𝑎) and 𝐶(𝑏) be the private costs of ac-
tions 𝑎 and 𝑏, respectively, where “private costs” means that they are not contractable. The 
actual output ?̃? is known to the manager only when it is produced; hence, it is also not con-
tractable. In fact, only the reported output, which is defined below, is contractable in our 
model.  
Contracting
Ex Ante Ex Post
𝜀̃ realized
0  
Nash equilibrium 
in 𝑎, 𝑏,  
 
Figure 1. Timeline of Events 
As indicated in the above timeline, at the time of contracting, the random shock is not yet 
realized; but at the time when the manager and the owner take their actions, the random 
shock is realized and publicly known. Specifically, at the time when the owner offers a contract 
to the manager, both parties know the distribution function Ψ of 𝜀̃ but not 𝜀̃, where Ψ is inde-
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pendent of the action variables; and at the time when they take actions, they know the value of 
𝜀̃. This reflects the fact that, under central planning, contracts are typically decided in advance 
in a 5-year plan, but actions are taken throughout the 5-year period. Even in a market econo-
my, evidence suggests that contractual relationships are stable over time.5  
Internal corruption is another important aspect. The manager possesses certain control 
rights, which she may exercise to her own benefits. The extent of corruption is measured by 
how much of the company’s output the manager steals. To prevent corruption, a monitoring 
system is set up to catch theft with a certain probability. Specifically, let   be the amount of 
stealing by the manager, 𝑝 be the probability of catching the manager stealing, and 𝜙( ) be the 
monetary penalty if the manager is caught stealing. The stolen amount   is unobservable and 
hence not contractable. After stealing the amount  , the manager announces output ?̃? −  . This 
reported output is contractable. A contract is a function 𝑠:ℝ → ℝ  that specifies payment 
𝑠(?̃? −  ) to the manager.  
Payoff is defined as income minus cost. In particular, the owner’s payoff is the firm’s prof-
it minus his cost of action, and the manager’s payoff is the manager’s income minus her cost of 
action. Although both the owner and the manager are risk neutral in income, they are risk 
averse in payoff since their cost functions are convex. Under private ownership, the owner 
maximizes his expected payoff 𝑉. Under state ownership, the owner is the government, which 
maximizes social welfare, where social welfare is defined by  
 𝑊 = 𝑉 + 𝛿𝑈, (2) 
where 𝑈 is the manager’s expected payoff, and 𝛿 ≥ 0 is an arbitrary fixed number that serves 
as the weight of social welfare on the manager’s payoff. When 𝛿 = 0, the government cares 
about the firm’s payoff only. 
As indicated by the timeline, our solution is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The 
principal offers a take-it-or-leave-it contract ex ante, conditional on an ex post Nash equilibri-
um in actions. After the contract is accepted, the two parties take actions ex post and reach a 
Nash equilibrium in the ex post subgame. 
We impose standard assumptions on the functions: 
𝜙′( ) ≥ 0, 𝜙′′( ) ≥ 0,   
𝑐′(𝑎) ≥ 0, 𝑐′′(𝑎) ≥ 0, 𝐶′(𝑏) ≥ 0, 𝐶′′(𝑏) ≥ 0,
𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑏) ≥ 0, 𝑓𝑏(𝑎, 𝑏) ≥ 0, 𝑓𝑎𝑎(𝑎, 𝑏) ≤ 0, 𝑓𝑏𝑏(𝑎, 𝑏) ≤ 0,
 
Further, assume that 𝜙(0) = 𝑐(0) = 𝐶(0) = 0. 
                                                        
5 A recent paper by Chen et al. (2015) investigates organizational structures and contractual terms in franchise 
chains in the US, taking into account spatial factors such as the intensity of competition, industry types and physi-
cal distances. Their results suggest that contractual terms may be more stable than organizational structures among 
competing firms. 
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3. The Market Solution 
In the market economy,  
(a) the firm is privately owned and the owner maximizes profits; 
(b) any contract is admissible. 
Specifically, the set of admissible contracts is 
𝒮 = {𝑠:ℝ → ℝ|𝑠 is Lebesgue integrable}. 
Suppose that the firm is owned by a private owner who cares about profit. This owner offers 
an admissible contract to the manager. After accepting the contract, with a realized value of 𝜀̃, 
in the ex post subgame of actions, given the owner’s action 𝑏 in Nash equilibrium, the manag-
er’s problem is:  

max
𝑎,𝑧
  𝑠[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀̃ −  ] − 𝑐(𝑎) + ( − 𝑝) − 𝑝𝜙( ), (3) 
where ( − 𝑝)  is the manager’s expected income from stealing and 𝑝𝜙( ) is the expected 
penalty for stealing. Problem (3) implies two first-order conditions (FOCs):  
𝑠′[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀̃ −  ]𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑐′(𝑎),
 − 𝑝 = 𝑠′[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀̃ −  ] + 𝑝𝜙′( ).
 
These FOCs are called incentive comparability (IC) conditions. These two equations imply 
?̂?(𝜀, 𝑏) and  ̂(𝜀, 𝑏). We will also consider the second-order conditions (SOCs). On the other 
hand, after the contract is accepted and given the manager’s actions (𝑎,  ) in Nash equilibrium, 
the owner’s problem is 
 max 𝑏
 𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀̃ − 𝑠[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀̃ −  ] − ( − 𝑝) + 𝑝𝜙( ) − 𝐶(𝑏). (4) 
This implies an FOC:  
𝑓𝑏(𝑎, 𝑏){ − 𝑠′[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀̃ −  ]} = 𝐶′(𝑏). 
This is a third IC condition, and it implies ?̂?(𝜀, 𝑎,  ). We will also consider the SOC. The three 
IC conditions jointly determine an ex post Nash equilibrium in actions. Then, the owner’s ex-
ante contractual problem is 

𝑉∗ = max 
𝑎,𝑏,𝑧,𝑠(⋅)
𝐸{𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀̃ − 𝑠[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀̃ −  ] − ( − 𝑝) + 𝑝𝜙( )} − 𝐶(𝑏)
               s.t.    𝐼𝐶1:  𝑠′[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀̃ −  ]𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑐′(𝑎),
                        𝐼𝐶2:  𝑓𝑏(𝑎, 𝑏){ − 𝑠
′[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀̃ −  ]} = 𝐶′(𝑏),
                        𝐼𝐶3:   − 𝑝 = 𝑠′[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀̃ −  ] + 𝑝𝜙′( ),
                        𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑠:  Two SOCs for (3) and one SOC for (4),
                        𝐼𝑅:  𝐸{𝑠[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀̃ −  ] − 𝑐(𝑎) + ( − 𝑝) − 𝑝𝜙( )} ≥ 0.
 
The last condition is the individual-rationality (IR) condition for the manager, stating that the 
manager’s expected payoff is positive. Note that 𝑎, 𝑏, and   are functions of 𝜀. The solution to 
problem (5) is stated in the following proposition.  
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Proposition 1 (Market Solution). Suppose the following problem has a solution (𝑎∗, 𝑏∗). 

𝑉∗ = max 
𝑎,𝑏≥0
 𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) − 𝑐(𝑎) − 𝐶(𝑏) + 𝜀̅
             s.t.  
𝑐′(𝑎)
𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑏)
+
𝐶′(𝑏)
𝑓𝑏(𝑎, 𝑏)
=  .
 
Given this (𝑎∗, 𝑏∗), let  ∗ be a solution to the following equation: 

𝑐′(𝑎∗)
𝑓𝑎(𝑎∗, 𝑏∗)
+ 𝑝[ + 𝜙′( )] =  . 
Then an optimal solution under the market economy exists and it is (𝑎∗, 𝑏∗,  ∗, 𝑠∗(⋅)), where 
𝑠∗(⋅) is a linear contract 𝑠∗(𝑥) = 𝛼∗ + 𝜃∗𝑥 with 𝛼∗ and 𝜃∗ being constants defined by 
 
𝜃∗ =
𝑐′(𝑎∗)
𝑓𝑎(𝑎∗, 𝑏∗)
,
𝛼∗ = 𝑐(𝑎∗) − ( − 𝑝) ∗ + 𝑝𝜙( ∗) − 𝜃∗[𝑓(𝑎∗, 𝑏∗) + 𝜀̅ −  ∗].
 (8) 
We have  𝜃∗ ∈ (0,   ).  ∎ 
Notice that this solution under the market economy is independent of the random shock 𝜀̃ 
except for its mean 𝜀.̅ However, the solution under central planning will be dependent on the 
random shock and this dependence is crucial.  
4. The Planning Solution 
Under central planning,  
(a) the firm is state-owned and the owner maximizes social welfare; 
(b) only conditional fixed contracts are admissible. 
Because of the political doctrine which emphasizes equal pay for all, contracts in SOEs have 
the following form: 
 𝑠(𝑥) = {
 𝑠𝑙     if  𝑥 < 𝑥0;
 𝑠ℎ    if  𝑥 ≥ 𝑥0.
 
0x x
hs
ls
𝑠(𝑥)
 
Figure 2. A Conditional Fixed Contract 
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We call this form of contract a conditional fixed contract. Admissible contracts under state 
ownership are conditional fixed contracts. The political doctrine means that the pay is inde-
pendent of performance. However, over the years, this system of equal pay has suffered from 
severe incentive problems. Consequently, this system was adjusted to allow for bonuses, which 
leads to the above conditional fixed contract with a conditional bonus 𝑠ℎ − 𝑠𝑙.6 Although this 
contract may seem less efficient than a more flexible contract, as shown in our solution, it can 
be more efficient than the optimal contract in the market economy under some circumstances.  
Under central planning, a contract is typically formulated in advance under a 5-year plan. 
By the time the contract is implemented, the economic situation may have changed dramati-
cally. If the performance target 𝑥0 is set too low, the manager may not give her best, especially 
when the economic situation is good; if 𝑥0 is set too high, the manager may give up altogether 
trying to meet this target, especially when the economic situation is bad. Hence, if the output 
is fairly uncertain, such a contract may be quite inefficient and could lead to serious corrup-
tion. 
In contrast to the optimal solution in the market economy, the optimal solution under 
central planning is heavily dependent on the state of the economic environment. To facilitate 
discussion, we assume that 𝜀̃ takes only two possible values: 𝜀𝑔 in good times with probability 
𝑞, and 𝜀𝑏 in bad times with probability  − 𝑞, where 𝜀𝑔 > 𝜀𝑏 , i.e., 
𝑞 ≡ Pr(𝜀̃ = 𝜀𝑔),          − 𝑞 ≡ Pr(𝜀̃ = 𝜀𝑏). 
Correspondingly, each action variable is associated with two possible actions: the action in 
good times and the action in bad times. In good times, the manager may or may not act to 
obtain the high pay 𝑠ℎ; in bad times, the manager may or may not act to obtain the low pay 𝑠𝑙 . 
Hence, there are four possible combinations of actions and economic situations. We use the 
following subscripts to distinguish the actions and economic situations: 
𝑔 = good times,      𝑏 = bad times,        ℎ = high pay,        𝑙 = low pay. 
After accepting the contract, with a realized value 𝜀𝑖 , in the ex post subgame, given the 
owner’s action 𝑏 in Nash equilibrium, the manager’s problem is  
                                                        
6 This bonus can be in the form of a promotion. Under central planning, wages are based on a ladder system. 
The wage for each ladder is fixed. An employee can be promoted to a higher wage ladder under certain conditions, 
but he/she typically stays at the same wage ladder for many years. For example, Groves et al. (1995) mention that, 
under central planning, “Contracts generally had 3- or 4-year terms” and “The contracts committed the manager to 
meet certain performance indicators and established a structure of rewards and penalties. Profitability was always 
one of the performance indicators and was listed as the most important indicator.” Bai & Xu (2005) also mention 
that “A contract specified performance targets” and “Wages of employers and managers were determined according 
to a deterministic formula based on personal characteristic, e.g., age, tenure, education, residence, gender, and job 
title.” 
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
𝑢 ≡ max
𝑎,𝑧≥0
  𝑠[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀𝑖 −  ] − 𝑐(𝑎) + ( − 𝑝) − 𝑝𝜙( ). 
With the conditional fixed contract in (9), the manager’s ex post payoff is 
 𝑢 = {
 𝑠𝑙 − 𝑐(𝑎) + ( − 𝑝) − 𝑝𝜙( )    if   𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀𝑖 −  < 𝑥0,
 𝑠ℎ − 𝑐(𝑎) + ( − 𝑝) − 𝑝𝜙( )   if   𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀𝑖 −  ≥ 𝑥0.
 
Given a value 𝜀𝑖, if the manager is aiming for the low pay 𝑠𝑙 , then by (11) problem (10) implies 
that her choices (𝑎𝑖,𝑙 ,  𝑖,𝑙) must satisfy 
 𝑎𝑖,𝑙 = 0,         𝜙′( 𝑖,𝑙) =
 − 𝑝
𝑝
. 
Here, the subscripts (𝑖, 𝑙) mean that, when 𝜀̃ = 𝜀𝑖 the manager is aiming for the low pay 𝑠𝑙. We 
can see that the choices are the same whether 𝑖 = 𝑔 or 𝑏. 
On the other hand, given a value 𝜀𝑖 , if the manager is aiming for the high pay 𝑠ℎ, then by 
(11) problem (10) implies that her choices (𝑎𝑖,ℎ ,  𝑖,ℎ) are obtained from the following problem: 

max
𝑎,𝑧≥0
  𝑠ℎ − 𝑐(𝑎) + ( − 𝑝) − 𝑝𝜙( )
   s.t.   𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀𝑖 −  ≥ 𝑥0.
 
In this case, the manager will try to choose as small an 𝑎 as possible until the constraint be-
comes binding. The constraint must therefore be binding, implying that 

 𝑖,ℎ = 𝑓(𝑎𝑖,ℎ , 𝑏) + 𝜀𝑖 − 𝑥0, (14) 
where the subscripts (𝑖, ℎ) mean that, when 𝜀̃ = 𝜀𝑖 the manager is aiming for the high pay 𝑠ℎ. 
Then, problem (13) can be rewritten as 
max
𝑎
  𝑠ℎ − 𝑐(𝑎) + ( − 𝑝)[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀𝑖 − 𝑥0] − 𝑝𝜙[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀𝑖 − 𝑥0]. 
This problem implies that 

𝑐′(𝑎𝑖,ℎ)
𝑓𝑎(𝑎𝑖,ℎ , 𝑏)
+ 𝑝[ + 𝜙′( 𝑖,ℎ)] =  . 
Equations (14) and (15) jointly determine (𝑎𝑖,ℎ ,  𝑖,ℎ). Since  > 𝑝[ + 𝜙
′( 𝑖,ℎ)] by (15) and  =
𝑝[ + 𝜙′( 𝑖,𝑙)] by (12), we know that  𝑖,ℎ <  𝑖,𝑙 , indicating less corruption when the manager is 
aiming for the high pay.  
Assume that the government cares about social welfare, where the social welfare function 
is defined in (2). After a contract is accepted and given the manager’s actions (𝑎𝑖,ℎ ,  𝑖,ℎ) in 
Nash equilibrium, the owner—armed with the knowledge of 𝜀𝑖—decides on 𝑏 as follows: 

max
𝑏
  𝑓(𝑎𝑖,ℎ , 𝑏) + 𝜀𝑖 − 𝑠ℎ − ( − 𝑝) 𝑖,ℎ + 𝑝𝜙( 𝑖,ℎ) − 𝐶(𝑏)
+ 𝛿[𝑠ℎ − 𝑐(𝑎𝑖,ℎ) + ( − 𝑝) 𝑖,ℎ − 𝑝𝜙( 𝑖,ℎ)]. 

Equation (16) implies an IC condition: 

𝑓𝑏(𝑎𝑖,ℎ , 𝑏𝑖,ℎ) = 𝐶′(𝑏𝑖,ℎ). 
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Similarly, given the manager’s actions (𝑎𝑖,𝑙 ,  𝑖,𝑙) in Nash equilibrium, the IC condition is 

𝑓𝑏(𝑎𝑖,𝑙 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑙) = 𝐶′(𝑏𝑖,𝑙). 
Then, equations (12) and (18) determine an ex post Nash equilibrium (𝑎𝑖,𝑙 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑙 ,  𝑖,𝑙), and equa-
tions (14), (15) and (17) determine another ex post Nash equilibrium (𝑎𝑖,ℎ , 𝑏𝑖,ℎ,  𝑖,ℎ). 
Given the two possible Nash equilibria (𝑎𝑖,𝑙 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑙 ,  𝑖,𝑙) and (𝑎𝑖,ℎ , 𝑏𝑖,ℎ ,  𝑖,ℎ), the manager de-
cides between 𝑎𝑖,𝑙 and 𝑎𝑖,ℎ. For the manager to choose 𝑎𝑖,ℎ over 𝑎𝑖,𝑙 when 𝜀̃ = 𝜀𝑖, we need the 
following IC condition: 

𝑠ℎ − 𝑐(𝑎𝑖,ℎ) + ( − 𝑝) 𝑖,ℎ − 𝑝𝜙( 𝑖,ℎ) ≥ 𝑠𝑙 − 𝑐(𝑎𝑖,𝑙) + ( − 𝑝) 𝑖,𝑙 − 𝑝𝜙( 𝑖,𝑙). (19) 
We consider only the situation in which (19) holds when 𝜀̃ = 𝜀𝑔 and fails when 𝜀̃ = 𝜀𝑏  (see 
Remark 1 for other situations). Then, (19) implies the following two IC conditions: 

𝑠ℎ − 𝑐(𝑎𝑔,ℎ) + ( − 𝑝) 𝑔,ℎ − 𝑝𝜙( 𝑔,ℎ) ≥ 𝑠𝑙 − 𝑐(𝑎𝑔,𝑙) + ( − 𝑝) 𝑔,𝑙 − 𝑝𝜙( 𝑔,𝑙), 
and  

𝑠ℎ − 𝑐(𝑎𝑏,ℎ) + ( − 𝑝) 𝑏,ℎ − 𝑝𝜙( 𝑏,ℎ) < 𝑠𝑙 − 𝑐(𝑎𝑏,𝑙) + ( − 𝑝) 𝑏,𝑙 − 𝑝𝜙( 𝑏,𝑙). 
That is, the manager aims for the high pay by taking action 𝑎𝑔,ℎ in good times; she aims for the 
low pay by taking action 𝑎𝑏,𝑙 in bad times. However, without imposing (21), Lemma 3 shows 
that the manager will aim for the low pay in bad times in equilibrium. Hence, condition (21) is 
unnecessary. Further, the manager’s IR condition is 
𝑞[𝑠ℎ − 𝑐(𝑎𝑔,ℎ) + ( − 𝑝) 𝑔,ℎ − 𝑝𝜙( 𝑔,ℎ)] + ( − 𝑞)[𝑠𝑙 − 𝑐(𝑎𝑏,𝑙) + ( − 𝑝) 𝑏,𝑙 − 𝑝𝜙( 𝑏,𝑙)] ≥ 0. 
The government’s expected social welfare is  
𝑊 = 𝑞{𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔 − 𝑠ℎ − ( − 𝑝) 𝑔,ℎ + 𝑝𝜙( 𝑔,ℎ) − 𝐶(𝑏𝑔,ℎ)
              +𝛿[𝑠ℎ − 𝑐(𝑎𝑔,ℎ) + ( − 𝑝) 𝑔,ℎ − 𝑝𝜙( 𝑔,ℎ)]}
          +( − 𝑞){𝑓(𝑎𝑏,𝑙 , 𝑏𝑏,𝑙) + 𝜀𝑏 − 𝑠𝑙 − ( − 𝑝) 𝑏,𝑙 + 𝑝𝜙( 𝑏,𝑙) − 𝐶(𝑏𝑏,𝑙)
              +𝛿[𝑠𝑙 − 𝑐(𝑎𝑏,𝑙) + ( − 𝑝) 𝑏,𝑙 − 𝑝𝜙( 𝑏,𝑙)]}.
 
With the above derivation of the equilibria and the IC and IR conditions, the government’s ex-
ante contractual problem can now be stated:  

?̂? = max
𝑎𝑔,ℎ,𝑏𝑔,ℎ,𝑧𝑔,ℎ,𝑎𝑏,𝑙,
𝑏𝑏,𝑙,𝑧𝑏,𝑙,𝑠𝑙,𝑠ℎ,𝑥0≥0
  𝑊
                       s.t.            𝑓𝑏(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) = 𝐶′(𝑏𝑔,ℎ),
                                        
𝑐′(𝑎𝑔,ℎ)
𝑓𝑎(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ)
+ 𝑝[ + 𝜙′( 𝑔,ℎ)] =  ,
                                         𝑔,ℎ = 𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔 − 𝑥0,
                                        𝑎𝑏,𝑙 = 0,    𝑓𝑏(0, 𝑏𝑏,𝑙) = 𝐶
′(𝑏𝑏,𝑙),    𝜙
′( 𝑏,𝑙) =
 − 𝑝
𝑝
,
                                        IC condition (20),
                                        IR condition (22).
 
12/44 
The solution to problem (23) is stated in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2 (Planning Solution). Assume that 𝑓𝑎𝑏(𝑎, 𝑏) ≥ 0 and 𝜙 is increasing and strict-
ly convex with 𝑝[ + 𝜙′(0)] ≤  . Under central planning, an optimal solution exists and is 
determined through the following steps. First, the manager aims for the high pay in good 
times and the low pay in bad times as part of her optimal strategy. Second, determine 
(?̂?𝑔,ℎ , ?̂?𝑔,ℎ ,  ̂𝑔,ℎ) from 
𝑓𝑏(?̂?𝑔,ℎ , ?̂?𝑔,ℎ) = 𝐶
′(?̂?𝑔,ℎ),          
𝑐′(?̂?𝑔,ℎ)
𝑓𝑎(?̂?𝑔,ℎ , ?̂?𝑔,ℎ)
+ 𝑝[ + 𝜙′(0)] =  ,          ̂𝑔,ℎ = 0; 
and (?̂?𝑏,𝑙 , ?̂?𝑏,𝑙 ,  ̂𝑏,𝑙)  from 
?̂?𝑏,𝑙 = 0,            𝑓𝑏(0, ?̂?𝑏,𝑙) = 𝐶
′(?̂?𝑏,𝑙),           𝜙
′( ̂𝑏,𝑙) =
 − 𝑝
𝑝
, 
Third, define the optimal conditional fixed contract (𝑥0, ?̂?ℎ, ?̂?𝑙) by 
 
𝑥0 = 𝑓(?̂?𝑔,ℎ , ?̂?𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔,
?̂?ℎ − ?̂?𝑙 ≥ ( − 𝑝) ̂𝑏,𝑙 − 𝑝𝜙( ̂𝑏,𝑙) + 𝑐(?̂?𝑔,ℎ),
?̅? = 𝑞𝑐(?̂?𝑔,ℎ) − ( − 𝑞)[( − 𝑝) ̂𝑏,𝑙 − 𝑝𝜙( ̂𝑏,𝑙)],
 (24) 
where ?̅? ≡ 𝑞?̂?ℎ + ( − 𝑞)?̂?𝑙 is the mean pay. Finally, calculate social welfare from 
?̂? = 𝑞[𝑓(?̂?𝑔,ℎ , ?̂?𝑔,ℎ) − 𝑐(?̂?𝑔,ℎ) − 𝐶(?̂?𝑔,ℎ)] + ( − 𝑞)[𝑓(0, ?̂?𝑏,𝑙) − 𝐶(?̂?𝑏,𝑙)] + 𝜀.̅  ∎ 
Condition 𝑓𝑎𝑏(𝑎, 𝑏) ≥ 0 means that the two inputs are complementary. Notice that the 
planning solution in Proposition 2 is completely independent of the weight 𝛿 of social welfare 
on the manager’s payoff. Also, since one of the conditions in (24) is an inequality, the optimal 
contract is not unique. 
Remark 1. The manager may pick one of the other three possible combinations of actions and 
economic situations: (1) in either economic situation, the manager aims for 𝑠ℎ; (2) in either 
economic situation, the manager aims for 𝑠𝑙; and (3) the manager aims for 𝑠ℎ in bad times and 
𝑠𝑙 in good times. Under trivial conditions, these solutions are inferior to that in (20)-(21). This 
is intuitively understandable. 
Remark 2. We can also add a social cost of stealing, say 𝜑( ), into our model. However, the 
results are very much the same. 
5. Theoretical Analysis 
To analyze and compare the two contractual solutions, consider the following simple par-
ametric case: 
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 𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝜇1𝑎 + 𝜇2𝑏,        𝑐(𝑎) =
 
2
𝑎2,        𝐶(𝑏) =
 
2
𝑏2,        𝜙( ) =
 
2
 2, (25) 
where 𝜇1, 𝜇2 > 0.  
The Market Solution 
By Proposition 1, the market solution is  
𝑎∗ =
𝜇1
3
𝜇1
2 + 𝜇2
2  ,          𝑏
∗ =
𝜇2
3
𝜇1
2 + 𝜇2
2  ,          𝜃
∗ =
𝜇1
2
𝜇1
2 + 𝜇2
2 , 
and the stolen amount is 
  
∗ = { 
 
𝑝
𝜇2
2
𝜇1
2 + 𝜇2
2 −  if   
𝜇2
2
𝜇1
2 + 𝜇2
2 > 𝑝,
0 otherwise.
 (26) 
Social welfare is 
 𝑊∗ = 𝑉∗ =
𝜇2
2𝜇1
2 + 𝜇1
4 + 𝜇2
4
2(𝜇1
2 + 𝜇2
2)
+ 𝜀.̅ (27) 
 The Planning Solution 
By Proposition 2, the planning solution is 
 ?̂?𝑏,𝑙 = 0,         ?̂?𝑔,ℎ = ( − 𝑝)𝜇1,         ?̂?𝑏,𝑙 = ?̂?𝑔,ℎ = 𝜇2,          ̂𝑏,𝑙 =
 − 𝑝
𝑝
,         ̂𝑔,ℎ = 0, (28) 
and the contract (𝑥0, ?̂?ℎ, ?̂?𝑙) is defined by 
𝑥0 = ( − 𝑝)𝜇1
2 + 𝜇2
2 + 𝜀𝑔,
?̂?ℎ − ?̂?𝑙 ≥
( − 𝑝)2( + 𝑝𝜇1
2)
2𝑝
,
?̅? =
( − 𝑝)2(𝑞𝑝𝜇1
2 −  + 𝑞)
2𝑝
.
 
Social welfare is 
 ?̂? =
𝑞
2
( − 𝑝2)𝜇1
2 +
 
2
𝜇2
2 + 𝜀.̅ (29) 
Several remarks about the solutions are in order. First, the planning solution does not de-
pend on the weight 𝛿 of social welfare on the manager’s payoff. That is, the planning solution 
is the same whether or not the government cares about firm profits only and whether or not 
the government cares about the manager’s welfare. Hence, the “for profits” objective is fully 
aligned with the “for social welfare” objective in equilibrium. This alignment is a feature of 
contract theory. It holds for both state and private ownership because the owner can design a 
contract to allocate income properly. 
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Second, by (26) we find that there is no corruption under private ownership if the proba-
bility that stealing is caught is large enough or if the manager has a relatively important role to 
play (large 𝜇1/𝜇2). However, by (27) the owner’s expected payoff is independent of 𝑝, implying 
that she has no incentive to crack down on corruption. The reason is that the manager’s ex-
pected income ( − 𝑝) − 𝑝𝜙( ) from corruption has been taken into account by the owner in 
the compensation package to the manager. Only if corruption incurs an extra cost, such as a 
negative effect on the firm’s reputation, will a privately owned firm completely eliminate 
corruption. 
Third, by (28), a state-owned firm is corruption free in good times but not in bad times. 
That is, corruption will occur in a state-owned firm when the economic situation is bad. Fur-
ther, since social welfare is decreasing in 𝑝, the owner has the incentive to reduce 𝑝; and when 
𝑝 is reduced, corruption increases. This is consistent with the real-life observation that serious 
corruption tends to occur in state-owned firms.  
In sum, private ownership can completely eliminate corruption; but state ownership and 
corruption go hand in hand in bad times, and there is a tendency for corruption to get out of 
hand. The explanation is that under private ownership, the owner can utilize the contract to 
effectively control corruption; under state ownership, in good times the owner can effectively 
control corruption by giving a bonus 𝑠ℎ − 𝑠𝑙, but in bad times no bonuses would be given. 
Market vs. Planning Solutions 
The market solution is better than the planning solution under circumstances described 
in Proposition 3.  
Proposition 3 (Market vs. Planning Solutions). The market solution is better if the envi-
ronment is risky, corruption is limited, or the manager plays a more important role than the 
owner. More specifically, the market solution is better if and only if 
 
𝜇2
𝜇1
≤ √
 
𝑞( − 𝑝2)
−   . (30) 
This condition leads to the following conclusions: 
(a) If the environment is quite risky (𝑞 ≤
1
(1−𝑝2)[1+(𝜇2 𝜇1⁄ )2]
), the market solution is better; 
otherwise the planning solution is better. 
(b) If the role of the manager is important (
𝜇2
𝜇1
≤ √
1
𝑞(1−𝑝2)
−   ), the market solution is better; 
otherwise the planning solution is better. 
(c) If corruption can be effectively curbed (𝑝 ≥ √ −
1
𝑞[1+(𝜇2 𝜇1⁄ )2]
 ), the market solution is 
better; otherwise the planning solution is better. 
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(d) If a safer environment (a larger 𝑞) is coupled with more effective control of corruption (a 
larger 𝑝), the market solution is better; otherwise the planning solution is better. ∎ 
The planning solution converges to the first best (defined in the Appendix) when 𝑝 → 0 
and 𝑞 →  . That is, if times are always good, the planning solution can be efficient.7 However, 
the market solution is better under normal circumstances as described in Proposition 3. 
In the market economy, the flexibility of contract form allows the two parties to share 
risks properly, while the doctrine of equal pay under central planning hinders proper risk 
sharing. Hence, when business risk is high, the market economy is better than central plan-
ning. This explains part (a) of Proposition 3.  
When the manager is the sole contributor to the firm (𝜇1 = 0),  the market solution 
achieves efficiency,8 while the planning solution is inefficient since it does not distribute risks 
properly (as mentioned before). This explains part (b) of Proposition 3.  
Under private ownership, the owner’s view is narrow—she cares about profits only. In our 
current model setting, we do not explicitly include a social cost of corruption (as mentioned in 
Remark 2), i.e., a transaction cost on stealing. This means that corruption causes only a distor-
tion of the income allocation in the current model. This distortion may substantially reduce 
the owner’s incentive in the market economy. Hence, when good times are likely, the planning 
solution may be better since it ensures that both parties aim for the high pay. This explains 
parts (c) and (d) of Proposition 3. These results indicate the importance of sound corporate 
governance in the market economy. This is particularly relevant to the debate on nationalizing 
banks in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis.  
In summary, business risk justifies a market solution; if business risk is low, sound corpo-
rate governance is necessary to justify a market solution; if corruption cannot be effectively 
curbed and business risk is not high enough to justify a market solution, central planning is 
generally better; finally, if business risk is low and corporate governance is poor, the domi-
nance of the manager can still justify a market solution; otherwise central planning is better. 
Our conclusion is consistent with some empirical studies claiming that the benefits of pri-
vatization are conditional on the environment. For example, in developed countries D’Souza et 
                                                        
7 Caves & Christensen (1980) do not find government ownership to be less efficient than private ownership. 
They study two major Canadian railroads under different ownership schemes. In their case, demand for railway 
services tends to be quite stable, which may fall under our case with 𝑞 ≈  . The authors even find that, in a good 
period (1963–1975), the state-owned railway company delivers a higher productivity growth than does the privately 
owned railway company. 
8 In this case, we have a single moral hazard. With a single moral hazard and risk neutrality in income, the op-
timal linear contract achieves efficiency (the first best) in the market economy. We can also see this by verifying 
𝑊∗ = 𝑊∗∗ when 𝜇1 = 0 for 𝑊
∗ and 𝑊∗∗ in (27) and (59), respectively.  
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al. (2005) find that firm-level factors such as the percentage of state and foreign ownership 
appear to have the most significant impact on post-privatization performance, while in devel-
oping countries Boubakri et al. (2005b) identify institutional factors as significant determi-
nants. In the following section, we conduct an empirical analysis based on our theory. 
6. Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we use Chinese data to test our theory.9 The advantages of the Chinese da-
ta are: (1) many firms are involved; (2) most of these firms are large and dominant firms in 
their industries; (3) the dataset is rich, containing all sorts of information; and (4) the privati-
zation date can be treated as exogenous since it is heavily influenced by many unobservable 
factors (Lu et al., 2008), so there is no concern of endogeneity regarding the privatization date. 
6.1. Data Sources and Definition of Variables 
Privatization of firms listed on the Chinese stock exchanges (the split-share reform) began 
in May 2005 and was almost completed in 2007.10 As shown in Li et al. (2011), by the end of 
2007, 1,254 firms out of total 1,315 firms, representing over 97% of the Chinese A-share stock 
market capitalization at that time, had completed the privatization process. Our dataset covers 
the years from 2003 to 2007 and is obtained from three sources. Our financial data come 
mainly from the CCER (China Center for Economic Research) database, which contains data 
on companies listed on the Chinese stock exchanges. We collect data on corporate governance 
mainly from the CSMAR (China Stock Market and Accounting Research) database, which 
contains data on the corporate governance of firms listed on the Chinese stock exchanges. Also, 
we hand-collected data from the firms’ annual reports.  
We exclude 1) banks and financial firms, 2) those listed firms whose IPO dates were in 
2002, and 3) those listed firms whose debt ratios (total debt to total assets) exceeded 1.11 This 
process left us with 1046 firms, or more than 90% of the firms listed on the Chinese stock 
exchanges. With this database, we empirically investigate the change in firm value before and 
after privatization.  
                                                        
9 Because of space constraint, only the most important empirical results are presented. 
10 Beginning in May 2005, the firms underwent privatization in groups, one group a time. Excluding the initial 
two experimental groups, a total of 65 groups were privatized over time. For a detailed description of this split-
share reform, see Lu et al. (2008), Li et al. (2011) and Liao et al. (2014). 
11 We exclude banks and financial firms since their valuation methods are not comparable to those of nonfi-
nancial firms. We exclude companies whose IPO dates were in 2002 since window dressing tends to occur in the 
first year after the IPO.  
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We now define variables for our regression model:12 
Controller: a category variable describing the types of ultimate controllers, which takes 
the value of 0 if the controller is the central or a local government (i.e., the firm is an SOE), the 
value of   if the controller is an individual (i.e., the firm is privately owned), and the value of 2 
if the controller is a foreign investor. This variable defines private firm and foreign firm, as 
shown in Table 3. In our dataset, more than 70% of the firms are SOEs, less than 1% of the 
firms are controlled by foreign investors, and the rest are private firms.13  
CR_5: the proportion of shares held by the biggest five shareholders.  
Tobin’s Q, or Q: the ratio of the sum of the equity market value, the book value of long-
term debt and net current liabilities to the book value of total assets. 
First control: a dummy that takes the value of   if there exists an absolute controller hold-
ing more than 50% of the shares, and 0 if there is no such controller. 
Independence ratio: the ratio of the number of outside directors to the total number of di-
rectors. An outside director is a board member and affiliated with the firm only through direc-
torship. 
Reform indicator: a dummy that takes the value of   if privatization has taken place in a 
given year, and 0 otherwise. 
Industry Q: the annual average Q for firms in an industry. The industry classification is 
given by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), which is the counterpart of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US. According to this classification, there 
are 13 industries and 76 sub-industries in total in China. 
Sales growth rate: the increase in sales over the previous year in percentage. 
Leverage: the ratio of debt to total assets. 
Depreciation: a yearly accounting expense on the use of assets. The total depreciation is 
also called accumulated depreciation. 
Forced turnover: a dummy that takes the value of   if the CEO’s contract is terminated 
prematurely and he/she is forced to depart without there being a more prestigious position 
waiting for him/her elsewhere, and 0 otherwise. 
Institutional shares: the percentage of shares held by institutional investors. 
                                                        
12 We present variables in italics. 
13 All listed firms except four have nontradable shares before 2005. Private firms (privately held firms) also 
underwent the split-share reform, not just SOEs. We have used a subsample containing only SOEs to run a robust-
ness check. Our main findings remain unchanged using this subsample. That is, the main results remain the same 
when we focus on SOEs only. 
18/44 
Liquidity: the average ratio of the daily absolute stock returns to the trading volume in 
dollars on a given day. It is an illiquidity measure proposed by Amihud (2002).  
Asset utilization: the ratio of annual sales to total assets. Note that non-operating income 
is not included in annual sales in order to avoid the effect of exogenous shocks. 
Expense ratio: the ratio of operating expense to annual sales. This definition follows Ang 
et al. (2000). The operating expense is the total expense less the cost of goods sold, interest 
expenses, and managerial compensation.  
Management share: the proportion of shares held by senior managers, including board 
members and supervisory committee members. 
First mover: a dummy that takes the value of   if a firm was privatized in 2005. Year 
2005 was the first year of privatization and about 400 firms were privatized in 2005. 
FCFF: the free cash flow of the firm. It equals the operating cash flow minus expenses, 
taxes, changes in net working capital and changes in investments. 
EBITDA: the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. 
Big: a dummy variable that takes the value of   if the firm is in the top 25 percent in its 
industry in a given year in terms of size measured by total assets, and 0 otherwise. 
HHI: the Herfindahl–Hirschman index, which is a measure of a firm’s sales in relation to 
its industry. We use it as an indicator of a firm’s market power. 
6.2. Summary Statistics of Data 
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the key variables, including the number of observa-
tions, the mean, the minimum, the maximum, and the standard deviation across the whole 
sampling period. The variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to eliminate 
outliers. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Listed Firms 
Our sample for 1,046 firms listed on the Chinese stock exchanges during 2003–2007 is obtained from three 
sources. Our financial data come mainly from the CCER database, which contains data on companies listed on the 
Chinese stock exchanges. Our data on corporate governance come mainly from the CSMAR database, which con-
tains data on the corporate governance of firms listed on the Chinese stock exchanges. Also, we hand-collected data 
from the firms’ annual reports. The variables are defined in Subsection 6.1. In particular, EBITDA is the earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization; and CR_5 is the proportion of shares held by the biggest five 
shareholders. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Sales (billions) 5504 3.250 26.800 -0.003 1200.000 
EBITDA (billions) 5385 0.391 2.950 -3.300 133.000 
ROA 5534 0.984 96.084 -77.482 20.920 
ROE 5038 5.133 95.476 -113.600 44.140 
Capital expenditure 5523 0.226 2.307 -1.000 100.919 
Total assets (billions) 5543 3.810 18.000 0.000 719.000 
Depreciation (billions) 5386 0.140 1.020 -0.006 43.400 
Total depreciation (billions) 5497 0.136 1.090 -0.011 42.100 
Leverage 5208 0.514 0.186 0.000 0.999 
Equity value (billions) 5634 4.090 19.900 -2.040 1150.000 
Tobin’s Q 5502 3.640 46.468 0.348 3164.038 
Industry Q 5560 3.652 9.651 1.188 152.023 
Liquidity 5335 0.006 0.020 0.000 1.057 
Log firm age 5625 2.336 0.376 1.099 3.892 
No. of employees (thousands) 5521 3.588 12.104 0.000 400.513 
Board 5441 9.634 2.209 0.000 23.000 
Independence board 5441 3.245 0.874 0.000 10.000 
Independence ratio 5440 0.340 0.065 0.000 0.750 
CR_5 5430 0.545 0.146 0.023 0.960 
Shares held by the largest shareholder 5430 0.390 0.166 0.006 0.850 
Share held by institutions 4911 0.118 0.169 0.000 0.724 
Non-tradable share ratio 4376 0.565 0.133 0.000 0.913 
We are interested in the change in firm value before and after privatization. We use a uni-
variate test to examine the changes in the means and medians of Tobin’s Q and some operat-
ing criteria. We divide our panel data into two groups: those observations before privatization, 
and those after privatization. The univariate comparison is presented in Table 2. First, we use 
a binomial test to assess the changes in the means. For each measure, we calculate firm-
specific mean values in the years before and after privatization and then test for differences in 
mean values using a t-statistic. The results show that Tobin’s Q, ROA (return on assets), ROE 
(return on equity), asset utilization and liquidity14 all increase significantly. Second, we use a 
Wilcoxon test to determine the changes in the medians. We use the two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-
                                                        
14 Liquidity is estimated using a measure proposed by Amihud in 2002. The smaller the measure is, the more 
liquid the stock. 
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sum test and the Wilcoxon Z statistic to check whether the median values in the years before 
and after privatization have changed significantly (Kazmier & Pohl, 1984). Table 2 demon-
strates that the above results all hold and are not influenced by outliers. 
Table 2: Comparison between Firms before and after Privatization 
Our sample for 1,046 firms listed on the Chinese stock exchanges during 2003–2007 is obtained from three 
sources. Our financial data come mainly from the CCER database, which contains data on companies listed on the 
Chinese stock exchanges. Our data on corporate governance come mainly from the CSMAR database, which con-
tains data on the corporate governance of firms listed on the Chinese stock exchanges. Also, we hand-collected data 
from the firms’ annual reports. The variables are defined in Subsection 6.1. The significance levels at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% are identified by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
  Before the reform After the reform t value z value 
Tobin's Q Mean 1.924 2.221 -7.1806***  
 Median 1.584 1.690  -4.190*** 
 Obs 2889 2336   
ROA Mean 0.795 1.852 -8.0845***  
 Median 2.075 3.037  -10.735*** 
 Obs 2905 2342   
ROE Mean 1.541 6.252 -8.5564***  
 Median 4.670 6.927  -12.092*** 
 Obs 2687 2226   
Expense ratio Mean 6.497 5.683 4.0482***  
 Median 4.159 3.699  4.638*** 
 Obs 2825 2264   
Asset utilization Mean 0.618 0.706 -5.3429***  
 Median 0.493 0.576  -7.005*** 
 Obs 2900 2342   
Liquidity Mean 0.007 0.002 31.2515***  
 Median 0.005 0.001  39.192*** 
 Obs 2868 2280   
 
6.3. Empirical Results 
Tobin’s Q describes a firm’s investment or growth opportunities. Many scholars, including 
Daines (2001), Anderson & Reeb (2003) and Laporta et al. (2002), use it to represent firm 
value. Following Chung & Pruitt (1995), we calculate Tobin’s Q by dividing the sum of the 
equity market value, the book value of long-term debt and net current liabilities by the book 
value of total assets. Chung and Pruitt show that this simplified version of Tobin’s Q is not 
qualitatively different from the complicated version using the replacement value of total assets. 
Both versions evaluate Tobin’s Q at the end of a fiscal year. 
The main hypothesis of our empirical study is developed from our theory, which suggests 
that privatization increases firm value and the magnitude of the increase depends on market 
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risk, the strength of corporate governance, and the relative importance of the manager versus 
the owner. To test this hypothesis, we compare the same companies before and after privatiza-
tion across time; we also compare different companies under different forms of ownership and 
business environments at a given time. Since a higher proportion of institutional shares im-
plies better monitoring, we mainly use the proportion of institutional shares to represent the 
strength of corporate governance (which is the probability 𝑝 of catching theft in our theory). 
Our results stay the same if we use non-SOE ownership to represent the strength of corporate 
governance. Given the fact that higher market power means a more secure firm, we use either 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) or firm size to represent the probability 𝑞 of good 
times. We also use the dummy of whether or not there is a forced turnover to represent the 
relative importance of the manager 𝜇 ≡ 𝜇1/𝜇2. If a new CEO is appointed around the time of 
privatization, the CEO is more likely to be crucial to the firm. 
We find empirical evidence in support of our theoretical findings. First, we find that pri-
vatization significantly increases firm value as measured by both Tobin’s Q and buy-hold stock 
returns. Second, our empirical results confirm the theoretical conclusion that the magnitude 
of the increase in firm value is determined by 𝑝, 𝑞 and 𝜇.  
Our empirical analysis is divided into two parts, which are reported in Tables 3, 4 and 5.  
Part 1: The Effect of Privatization on Firm Value (Table 3) 
The purpose of part   is to investigate the effect of privatization on firm value. Our basic 
regression model is as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖 + 𝑒𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
where 𝑖 indicates a firm, 𝑗 indicates an industry, 𝑡 is time, and 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the dependent variable 
indicating the market value of firm 𝑖 in industry 𝑗 at time 𝑡 measured by Tobin’s Q. 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 is 
a dummy variable, which equals   if the firm went through the reform at time 𝑡, and 0 other-
wise. Another independent variable is 𝑦𝑗𝑡, which is used to control for the time-variant effect 
at the industry level measured by the average Tobin’s Q of that industry in a given year. A 
vector of control variables is indicated by 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡. Also, 𝑒𝑖 controls for time-invariant firm-specific 
unobserved variables, and 𝑒𝑡 controls for yearly fixed effects. The effect of the reform is repre-
sented by 𝛽1, which is the focus of our attention. 
A: No Control Variables 
We first simply regress the firm-level Q on industry Q and reform indicator without con-
trolling for many of the other factors. The industry-average Q for CSRC-classified industries is 
included to control for time-varying industry fixed effects, and the controller dummy is used 
to sort firms into state-owned, private and foreign enterprises.   
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We use a fixed effect panel data model to perform regressions, where the heteroscedastici-
ty-consistent standard errors are adjusted within the cluster in all models (Petersen, 2009). 
Panel (1) of Table 3 shows that the coefficient of the reform indicator is significantly positive. 
In fact, after privatization, the firm-level Q increases by 0.18 which is approximately 9% of the 
mean of the firm-level Q before privatization.   
B: Controlling  for Financial Factors 
Fama & French (1998) and Allayannis & Weston (2001) find evidence of a negative rela-
tion between leverage and Q. We thus control for leverage in our regression. As a firm’s cur-
rent and future profitability has an impact on its market value, following Berger & Ofek (1995) 
and Yermack (1996), we include ROA and the sales growth rate in our regressions. We use the 
yearly sales growth rate instead of the yearly earnings growth rate to avoid problems arising 
from the manipulability of earnings. We also control for FCFF scaled by total sales. According 
to Jensen (1986), firms with an excess free cash flow are more likely to invest in projects with 
a negative net present value. Hence, a firm with a low cash flow is expected to have a higher Q. 
We further control for firm age, industry effect and the type of ultimate controller. We control 
for firm age because older firms are expected to have better connections with suppliers, cus-
tomers and the government. As expected, Panel (2) of Table 3 shows that greater leverage 
implies a smaller Q, while a larger ROA implies a larger Q. However, the effects of FCFF and 
sales growth are statistically insignificant.  
C: Controlling for Corporate Governance 
For Chinese SOEs, privatization is an exogenous event. It allows holders of non-tradable 
shares (NTS) to sell their shares freely, leading to a change in ownership. Empirical studies 
have shown that firms with a better ownership structure have a higher market value (Jensen, 
1986; Morck et al., 1989; McConnell et al., 1990). We must therefore control for factors related 
to the ownership structure, such as the proportion of shares held by managers, the proportion 
of shares held by institutions, the proportion of shares held by the biggest five shareholders, 
and the first control dummy.15  
Ownership may be important for managerial incentives. Managers can increase share-
holder value in at least two ways. First, they can reduce excess consumption of perquisites. 
Second, they can invest in riskier assets, implying a transfer of wealth from creditors to share-
holders. We therefore control for the proportion of shares held by managers. Theoretical and 
empirical studies have shown that the larger the proportion of shares held by managers, the 
higher the firm value.  
                                                        
15 We do not use the proportion of NTS due to serious multicollinearity between this variable and the propor-
tion of shares held by the biggest five shareholders (CR_5). 
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We use two indexes to control for ownership concentration: the proportion of shares held 
by the biggest five shareholders and a dummy indicating whether or not an absolute controller 
exists. Shleifer & Vishny (1997) observe that the large premium associated with superior vot-
ing shares or control rights is evidence that controlling shareholders seek to extract private 
benefits from firms, implying a negative effect of ownership concentration on firm value. On 
the other hand, large shareholders may have incentives to monitor managers closely, implying 
a positive effect on firm value. Ultimately, the relation between ownership concentration and 
firm value is an empirical question. 
Board composition may also be important for firm value. Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg 
(1997) find a significant negative correlation between board size and firm value. They explain 
that, as the number of board members increases, more time is wasted on coordination, imply-
ing a negative effect on firm value. We therefore control for board size. We also control for the 
independence ratio, since outside board members would monitor managers more rigorously.  
Last, we also control for whether or not a firm was privatized early (i.e., in 2005). If a firm 
was privatized early, it would not have had the chance to learn from the experiences of others. 
That is, those firms that were privatized early would have gained less from privatization. 
Panel (3) in Table 3 provides our regression results on ownership structure. It shows that 
both ownership concentration and management shareholding will increase firm value. Institu-
tional investors increase firm value through their active monitoring. However, the coefficient 
of the independence ratio is statistically insignificant. With these additional control variables, 
the coefficient of the reform indicator remains statistically significant.  
D: Controlling for Growth Opportunity and Liquidity 
Myers (1977) and Yermack (1996) argue that a firm’s investment opportunities can affect 
its profitability, implying that a firm’s future investment opportunities have an impact on its 
current market value. Following Titman & Wessels (1988) and Eisenberg (1997), we use each 
firm’s change in assets in the previous year as a proxy for investment opportunities. We also 
use depreciation in robustness checks. Our regression results demonstrate that the coeffi-
cients of the change in assets and depreciation are all significantly positive, indicating a higher 
firm value for those firms that have better growth opportunities. Also, Panels (4) and (5) of 
Table 3 show that the coefficients of the reform indicator are still statistically significant even 
after controlling for future investment opportunities. 
Table 3. Effect of Privatization on Firm Value 
Our sample for 1,046 firms listed on the Chinese stock exchanges during 2003–2007 is obtained from three 
sources Our financial data come mainly from the CCER database, which contains data on companies listed on the 
Chinese stock exchanges. Our data on corporate governance come mainly from the CSMAR database, which con-
tains data on the corporate governance of firms listed on the Chinese stock exchanges. Also, we hand-collected data 
from the firms’ annual reports. The variables are defined in Subsection 6.1. In particular, Reform indicator is a 
dummy that takes the value of   if privatization has taken place in a given year, and 0 otherwise; FCFF is the free 
cash flow of the firm, which equals the operating cash flow minus expenses, taxes, changes in net working capital 
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and changes in investments; and CR_5 is the proportion of shares held by the biggest five shareholders. The 
significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% are identified by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Industry Q 0.0120 -0.000734 -0.00125 -0.00164 -0.00869 
 
(0.0122) (0.00786) (0.00842) (0.00836) (0.00632) 
Reform indicator 0.175** 0.221*** 0.220*** 0.215*** 0.206*** 
 
(0.0892) (0.0515) (0.0509) (0.0513) (0.0548) 
Firm age  
0.297 0.238 0.313 0.312 
 
 
(0.267) (0.293) (0.277) (0.269) 
Scaled FCFF  
0.000126 
   
 
 
(0.0000673) 
   
Sales growth rate  
-0.000355 0.00000685 0.0000581 0.000365 
 
 
(0.000339) (0.000377) (0.000362) (0.000386) 
ROA  
0.00882* 0.0123** 0.0139** 0.00949** 
 
 
(0.00533) (0.00588) (0.00586) (0.00476) 
Leverage  
-1.073*** -1.202*** -1.122*** -1.390*** 
 
 
(0.298) (0.341) (0.333) (0.279) 
Independence ratio   
0.318 
  
 
  
(0.312) 
  
CR_5   
-0.0767 -0.136 0.000522 
 
  
(0.285) (0.288) (0.288) 
Management share   
11.77** 
  
 
  
(5.077) 
  
Institutional share   
0.00568*** 0.00560*** 0.00612*** 
 
  
(0.00156) (0.00161) (0.00163) 
Change in fixed assets    
0.0271*** 
 
 
   
(0.00492) 
 
Scaled depreciation     
3.739* 
 
    
(2.135) 
Liquidity     
2.804 
 
    
(5.709) 
First control   
0.110* 0.110* 0.104* 
 
  
(0.0565) (0.0598) (0.0603) 
First mover -0.332*** -0.285*** -0.284*** -0.296*** -0.267*** 
 
(0.0698) (0.0597) (0.0530) (0.0550) (0.0554) 
Private share 0.207 0.136 0.145 0.152 0.155* 
 
(0.133) (0.0994) (0.0960) (0.0961) (0.0930) 
Foreign share 
 
0.125 0.153 0.157 0.160 0.00810 
 
(0.182) (0.200) (0.203) (0.202) (0.139) 
Constant 2.130*** 1.969*** 2.405*** 1.855*** 1.789*** 
 
(0.0499) (0.552) (0.760) (0.607) (0.620) 
Year effect Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y 
N 5197 5005 4531 4608 4448 
adj. R-sq 0.326 0.424 0.460 0.454 0.462 
p 9.30e-185 3.27e-230 2.10e-217 1.44e-213 1.06e-208 
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Part 2: What Determines the Benefits of Privatization (Tables 4 & 5)? 
We call the coefficient of the reform indicator the benefits of privatization. Part 1 has 
shown that privatization brings more benefits to firms than an improved ownership structure 
and liquidity. The purpose of part 2 is to connect our empirical study and our theory more 
tightly and determine the factors driving the benefits of privatization. For this purpose, we 
decompose the coefficient of the reform indicator and demonstrate that its magnitude is 
determined by the three factors in our theoretical model: the probability 𝑝 of catching theft, 
the probability 𝑞 of good times, and the relative importance 𝜇 of the manager. Our regression 
model is expanded to incorporate these three factors: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽31𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽32𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 × 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽41𝐶𝐺
            +𝛽42𝐶𝐺 × 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽51𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽52𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 × 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡
            +𝛾𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖 + 𝑒𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡
 
To test whether or not the three factors magnify the benefits of privatization, we interact 
reform indicator with the riskiness of a firm’s business environment, corporate governance 
(CG), and the relative importance of the manager. These three interaction terms enter our 
regression model. This method is also employed by Lemmon & Lins (2003), Beck & Maksi-
movic (2005), and Kalcheva & Lins (2007).  
Since a higher proportion of institutional shares means more intensive outsider monitor-
ing and less chance for mangers to steal, we mainly use the proportion of institutional shares 
to represent the strength of corporate governance in our regressions. Based on our theory, we 
expect this variable to not only have a positive effect on firm value but also magnify the bene-
fits of privatization.  
We use either HHI or firm size to represent business riskiness in our regression model 
(relating to the probability 𝑞 of good times in our theory). A higher HHI implies a larger mar-
ket power, thus lower business risk. We also use another dummy called big to represent big 
firms. It equals   if the firm is in the top 25 percent in its industry in a given year in terms of 
size measured by total assets, and 0 otherwise. Prior literature shows that bigger firms are able 
to deal with business risk better because of economies of scale, diversification and spillovers. 
Based on our theory, we expect these variables to have a negative effect on not only firm value 
but also the benefits of privatization. 
Also, we use a dummy on whether there is a forced turnover to measure the relative im-
portance of the manager. Based on our theory, we expect this dummy to have a positive effect 
on not only firm value but also the benefits of privatization. 
The regression results are presented in Tables 4 and 5. In Table 4 institutional share is a 
proxy for the probability of catching theft, while in Table 5 the proxy is the Non-SOE dummy. 
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In Table 4, we use HHI to measure a firm’s market power from Panels (1) to (4), and use big to 
measure a firm’s market power from Panels (5) to (8). From Panels (1) to (8) of Table 4, a firm 
consistently has a larger Tobin’s Q if more of its shares are held by institutional investors, if it 
has lower market power measured by either HHI or size, or if there is a forced turnover. 
Moreover, Panels (1) and (5) of Table 4 show that the coefficients of the interaction term 
between reform indicator and the proportion of institutional shares are significantly positive 
when only this interaction term is present, implying that sound corporate governance is able 
to magnify the benefits of privatization. Similarly, Panels (3) and (7) in Table 4 show that the 
coefficients of the interaction term between reform indicator and forced turnover are signifi-
cantly positive when only this interaction term is present, indicating the importance of the 
manager can magnify the benefits of privatization. In Panel (2), HHI is used to measure a 
firm’s market power, and the interaction term between HHI and reform indicator is signifi-
cantly negative, supporting our theoretical prediction that firms with low business risk benefit 
less from privatization. The same conclusion is inferred from Panel (6), when we use firm size 
as a proxy for business risk. Finally, Panels (4) and (8) show that our results above stay the 
same when the three interaction terms are all present. 
The panels also show that even after controlling for the three variables, their interaction 
terms and the industry effect, the coefficient of the reform indicator is still significantly posi-
tive. This means that firm value increases after privatization, confirming once again the results 
in Table 3.  
We have also conducted robustness checks in Table 5 in which the variable institutional 
share is replaced by the Non-SOE dummy. The Non-SOE dummy is equal to   if the listed 
firm is not an SOE, and 0 otherwise. It is generally believed that a non-SOE’s corporate gov-
ernance is better than that of an SOE, implying that the probability of catching theft is higher 
in non-SOEs with other things the same. Therefore we use the Non-SOE dummy as a proxy for 
corporate governance in Table 5. All of the main findings stay the same, suggesting that the 
results are robust. Furthermore, in Panels (4) and (8), the coefficients of reform indicator 
become insignificant once the three interaction terms are included, meaning that the benefits 
of privatization have been absorbed by the three interaction terms. In other words, the bene-
fits of privatization in our regression model can be fully explained by the three factors in our 
theoretical model: internal governance, external risk and the relative importance of the man-
ager. Therefore, the three factors fully capture the benefits of privatization, in the sense that 
privatization does not increase firm value unless the firm has sound corporate governance, 
operates in a risky business environment, and its manager plays a more important role than 
the owner. 
Table 4. Determinants of the Benefits of Privatization with Corporate Governance Measured by Institutional Shares 
Our sample for 1,046 firms listed on the Chinese stock exchanges during 2003–2007 is obtained from three sources. Our financial data come mainly from the CCER database, which 
contains data on companies listed on the Chinese stock exchanges. Our data on corporate governance come mainly from the CSMAR database, which contains data on the corporate 
governance of firms listed on the Chinese stock exchanges. Also, we hand-collected data from the firms’ annual reports. The variables are defined in Subsection 6.1. In particular, 
Reform indicator is a dummy that takes the value of   if privatization has taken place in a given year, and 0 otherwise; HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which is a measure of a 
firm’s sales in relation to its industry and an indicator of a firm’s market power; and _cons is the constant term. The significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% are identified by ***, ** 
and *, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
w_q w_q w_q w_q w_q w_q w_q w_q 
Industry Q 0.0690*** 0.0745*** 0.0690*** 0.0737*** 0.0675*** 0.0678*** 0.0674*** 0.0668*** 
 
(0.00910) (0.00915) (0.00902) (0.00910) (0.00881) (0.00857) (0.00875) (0.00853) 
Reform indicator 0.106*** 0.326*** 0.173*** 0.1375** 0.0891** 0.756*** 0.152*** 0.6296*** 
 
(0.0397) (0.0446) (0.0360) (0.0576) (0.0375) (0.116) (0.0344) (0.1135) 
Institutional share 0.00410*** 0.0121*** 0.0122*** 0.00369*** 0.00635*** 0.0146*** 0.0142*** 0.00407*** 
 
(0.00142) (0.00158) (0.00158) (0.00141) (0.00127) (0.00148) (0.00148) (0.00123) 
Forced turnover 0.0974*** 0.0955*** 0.0302 0.0214 0.0726** 0.0873*** 0.00288 0.0253 
 
(0.0330) (0.0336) (0.0350) (0.0348) (0.0316) (0.0323) (0.0344) (0.0333) 
HHI -0.279*** -0.203*** -0.287*** -0.189*** 
    
 
(0.0457) (0.0426) (0.0453) (0.0431) 
    
Big 
    
-1.010*** -0.773*** -1.019*** -0.719*** 
 
    
(0.0790) (0.0732) (0.0786) (0.0738) 
Reform × Institutional share 0.0115*** 
  
0.0120*** 0.0113*** 
  
0.0154*** 
 
(0.00225) 
  
(0.00225) (0.00219) 
  
(0.00216) 
Reform × HHI 
 
-0.208*** 
 
-0.219*** 
    
 
 
(0.0620) 
 
(0.0616) 
    
Reform × Big 
     
-0.666*** 
 
-0.784*** 
 
     
(0.122) 
 
(0.122) 
Reform × Change of CEO 
  
0.159** 0.161** 
  
0.164** 0.137** 
 
  
(0.0666) (0.0669) 
  
(0.0658) (0.0625) 
_cons 1.677*** 1.568*** 1.636*** 1.655*** 2.339*** 2.073*** 2.304*** 2.138*** 
 
(0.0393) (0.0386) (0.0404) (0.0394) (0.0727) (0.0702) (0.0752) (0.0711) 
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N 4609 4609 4609 4609 4609 4609 4609 4609 
chi2 280.8 279.0 277.3 283.3 357.4 372.0 360.4 376.0 
p 1.05e-57 2.62e-57 5.91e-57 1.48e-56 4.06e-74 2.93e-77 8.88e-75 2.53e-76 
 
 
Table 5. Determinants of the Benefits of Privatization with Corporate Governance measured by the Non-SOE Dummy 
Our sample for 1,046 firms listed on the Chinese stock exchanges during 2003–2007 is obtained from three sources. Our financial data come mainly from the CCER database, which 
contains data on companies listed on the Chinese stock exchanges. Our data on corporate governance come mainly from the CSMAR database, which contains data on the corporate 
governance of firms listed on the Chinese stock exchanges. Also, we hand-collected data from the firms’ annual reports. The variables are defined in Subsection 6.1. In particular, 
Reform indicator is a dummy that takes the value of   if privatization has taken place in a given year, and 0 otherwise; HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which is a measure of a 
firm’s sales in relation to its industry and an indicator of a firm’s market power; and _cons is the constant term. The significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% are identified by ***, ** 
and *, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
w_q w_q w_q w_q w_q w_q w_q w_q 
Industry Q 0.0738*** 0.0802*** 0.0759*** 0.0766*** 0.0722*** 0.0745*** 0.0742*** 0.0719*** 
 
(0.00905) (0.00907) (0.00903) (0.00905) (0.00886) (0.00872) (0.00885) (0.00873) 
Reform indicator 0.304*** 0.308*** 0.171*** -0.2719 0.307*** 0.637*** 0.180*** 0.0625 
 
(0.0342) (0.0646) (0.0571) (0.5660) (0.0326) (0.130) (0.0561) (0.1223) 
Non-SOE -0.00158 0.103** 0.104** 0.0171 -0.0246 0.103** 0.0809* 0.0202 
 
(0.0569) (0.0495) (0.0500) (0.0563) (0.0540) (0.0458) (0.0477) (0.0520) 
Forced turnover 0.0871** 0.0894*** 0.0194 0.0260 0.0595* 0.0744** -0.0132 0.0128 
 
(0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0364) (0.0365) (0.0337) (0.0345) (0.0363) (0.0373) 
HHI -0.285*** -0.227*** -0.288*** -0.234***     
 
(0.0413) (0.0375) (0.0415) (0.0373) 
    
Big     
-1.014*** -0.827*** -1.013*** -0.843*** 
 
    
(0.0800) (0.0785) (0.0797) (0.0784) 
Reform × Non-SOE 0.639***   
0.597*** 0.657*** 
  
0.575*** 
 
(0.0644) 
  
(0.0659) (0.0628) 
  
(0.0638) 
Reform × HHI  
-0.160** 
 
-0.130** 
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(0.0655) 
 
(0.0646) 
    
Reform × Big 
     
-0.507*** 
 
-0.469*** 
 
     
(0.126) 
 
(0.124) 
Reform × Change of CEO 
  
0.171** 0.138** 
  
0.182*** 0.132* 
 
  
(0.0701) (0.0700) 
  
(0.0694) (0.0684) 
_cons 1.734*** 1.661*** 1.719*** 1.720*** 2.422*** 2.229*** 2.407*** 2.294*** 
 
(0.0398) (0.0391) (0.0400) (0.0396) (0.0758) (0.0758) (0.0762) (0.0759) 
N 5009 5009 5009 5009 5009 5009 5009 5009 
chi2 495.7 274.1 271.5 468.5 524.9 345.4 318.1 501.2 
p 7.05e-104 2.90e-56 1.04e-55 4.06e-96 3.65e-110 1.52e-71 1.10e-65 3.87e-103 
 
6.4. Main Empirical Findings 
Our empirical results are summarized as follows. First, firm value is increased after pri-
vatization, as measured by both Tobin’s Q and buy-hold stock returns.16 This is true even after 
controlling for ownership structure, financial factors, stock liquidity, and growth opportunities.  
Second, we incorporate the three variables 𝑝, 𝑞 and 𝜇 from our theoretical model into our 
regression model and find that these variables are significantly associated with firm value and 
these associations are consistent with the predictions of our theory. That is, firm value in-
creases with the strength of internal governance and the relative importance of the manager, 
and decreases with external risks. 
Third, the magnitude of the increase in firm value after privatization (the benefits of pri-
vatization) is determined by external risk, internal governance, and the relative importance of 
the manager. We generate three interaction terms between the reform indicator and the three 
factors. The larger the absolute value of the coefficient of an interaction term, the greater the 
factor’s contribution to the benefits of privatization. We find that better internal governance, 
more external risk and greater importance of the manager will all magnify the benefits of 
privatization. These empirical results remain even when we use different variables as proxies.  
The first empirical result is not new to the literature. The other two results have never 
been emphasized or shown in existing studies and also supports our theoretical findings.  
7. Concluding Remarks 
Understanding the role of ownership is key to understanding the proper role of the gov-
ernment in an economy. This paper analyses the contractual relationships of firms under state 
and private ownership. We focus on three factors: external risks, internal corruption, and 
relative importance of owners versus managers. The privatization literature typically ignores 
these factors. Our main theoretical conclusion is that the market solution is better if the busi-
ness environment is risky, corruption is limited, or the manager is more important to the firm 
than the owner; otherwise the planning solution is better. Our conclusion agrees with 
Turhan’s (2005) assessment in his survey that “both theoretical and empirical evidence con-
firms that the nature of ownership is important. Changes in managerial incentives and enter-
prise objectives are likely to affect the performance of enterprises.” 
Our empirical analysis supports our theoretical findings. Our main empirical conclusion 
is that the magnitude of change in firm value is significantly associated with the three key 
                                                        
16 Here, buy-hold stock returns are used in a robustness test. Results of all robustness tests for the regression 
results from Tables 3 to 5 are available upon request.  
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factors in our theoretical model, and the direction of change in firm value associated with each 
of these factors is consistent with the predictions of our theory.  
Some researchers, such as Vernon-Wortzel & Wortzel (1989) and Chang & Singh (1997), 
argue that SOEs and private firms face the same set of problems, in particular organizational 
problems, incentive problems, business risks, and even government interference. So there is 
no reason why SOEs and private firms should differ in economic efficiency. We take this ar-
gument into consideration in our model setting, instead of choosing a side first and trying to 
argue for why state ownership is good or bad. Our model is the only theoretical model that 
compares optimal solutions having different ownership arrangements under the same model 
setting. The same incentive problem, external risk and internal corruption exist; the only 
difference is the ownership, which leads to different contractual relationships. Our conclu-
sions are conditional on environmental factors, such as business risks, internal governance 
and the relative importance of owners versus managers. In the privatization literature, these 
factors are not discussed. However, these factors are important for privatization, as our theo-
retical and empirical analyses have indicated. 
Many of the existing theoretical arguments in support of privatization argue that the gov-
ernment does not maximize social welfare and therefore state ownership is inefficient because 
of a faulty political system. In contrast, we assume that the government does maximize social 
welfare. It is the doctrine of “equal pay for all” that limits the government’s choices, but it does 
not prevent the government from achieving efficiency under ideal circumstances. Instead, we 
emphasize certain factors that determine the differences between state and private ownership.  
We also assume complete markets. Our analysis is conditional on complete markets and 
focuses on the contractual differences between private and state ownership. As suggested in 
the literature, when markets are complete, private ownership has many advantages; when 
markets are incomplete, state ownership has a few advantages. Markets may not be complete 
when economic development is still in its infancy. If the financial market is incomplete, pri-
vate companies may have difficulty in obtaining funding for large and long-term projects. This 
is true for infrastructure projects and companies in computing industries, for example. The 
government can play an important role in this case. State ownership ensures funding and 
mitigates risks (risk sharing by all vs. risk sharing by a few investors). State ownership under 
incomplete markets is a broad topic in the literature, but our paper considers a well-developed 
economy with complete markets. Complete markets can resolve the problems of funding and 
risk sharing. Hence, our paper offers a unique viewpoint to the literature and addresses the 
question of why state ownership exists under complete markets.  
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Appendix 
All proofs are provided in this appendix. 
A.1. Proof of Proposition  1 
Notice that 𝑎, 𝑏, and   in problem (5) are functions of 𝜀. Hence, problem (5) can be more 
explicitly written in the following form: 
max 
𝑎,𝑏,𝑧,𝑠(⋅)
∫{𝑓[𝑎(𝜀), 𝑏(𝜀)] + 𝜀 − 𝑠{𝑓[𝑎(𝜀), 𝑏(𝜀)] + 𝜀 −  (𝜀)} − ( − 𝑝) (𝜀) + 𝑝𝜙( (𝜀)) − 𝐶[𝑏(𝜀)]} 𝑑Ψ(𝜀)
     s.t.    𝑠′{𝑓[𝑎(𝜀), 𝑏(𝜀)] + 𝜀 −  (𝜀)}𝑓𝑎[𝑎(𝜀), 𝑏(𝜀)] = 𝑐′[𝑎(𝜀)],
               𝑓𝑏[𝑎(𝜀), 𝑏(𝜀)]{ − 𝑠′[𝑓(𝑎(𝜀), 𝑏(𝜀)) + 𝜀 −  (𝜀)]} = 𝐶′[𝑏(𝜀)],
                − 𝑝 = 𝑠′{𝑓[𝑎(𝜀), 𝑏(𝜀)] + 𝜀 −  (𝜀)} + 𝑝𝜙′[ (𝜀)],
               SOCs, IR.
 
We first find that the IR condition must be binding. If not, given an optimal contract 𝑠∗, we 
would be able to reduce 𝑠∗ by a small fixed amount 𝜌 > 0 such that the IR condition would still 
hold. Then, all the conditions in (5) would be satisfied with this new contract 𝑠∗ + 𝜌 and the 
principal’s expected profit would be larger. This contradicts the fact that 𝑠∗ is an optimal 
contract. Hence, the IR condition must be binding. Using the binding IR condition, problem (5) 
becomes 

max 
𝑎,𝑏,𝑧,𝑠(⋅)
𝐸[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀̃ − 𝑐(𝑎) − 𝐶(𝑏)]
     s.t.    𝐼𝐶1:  𝑠′[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀̃ −  ]𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑐′(𝑎),
               𝐼𝐶2:  𝑓𝑏(𝑎, 𝑏){ − 𝑠
′[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀̃ − z]} = 𝐶′(𝑏),
               𝐼𝐶3:   − 𝑝 = 𝑠′[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀̃ − z] + 𝑝𝜙′( ),
               𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑠:  Two SOCs for ( ) and one SOC for (3),
                𝐼𝑅:  𝐸{𝑠[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀̃ −  ] − 𝑐(𝑎) + ( − 𝑝) − 𝑝𝜙( )} = 0.
 
From the 𝐼𝐶1 condition in (31), we can solve for 𝑠′ and substitute it into the other two IC condi-
tions. Then, the problem becomes 
max 
𝑎,𝑏,𝑧,𝑠(⋅)
𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) − 𝑐(𝑎) − 𝐶(𝑏)
     s.t.   𝑠′[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀 −  ]  =
𝑐′(𝑎)
𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑏)
,
              
𝑐′(𝑎)
𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑏)
+
𝐶′(𝑏)
𝑓𝑏(𝑎, 𝑏)
=  ,
              
𝑐′(𝑎)
𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑏)
+ 𝑝[ + 𝜙′( )] =  ,
              SOCs, IR.
 
Since the objective function does not involve the contract, this problem can be solved in four 
steps. First, by the Hamilton approach, we solve for (𝑎, 𝑏) from the following problem: 
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
max 
𝑎,𝑏≥0
 𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) − 𝑐(𝑎) − 𝐶(𝑏)
   s.t.  
𝑐′(𝑎)
𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑏)
+
𝐶′(𝑏)
𝑓𝑏(𝑎, 𝑏)
=  .
 
This solution to (𝑎, 𝑏) turns out to be independent of 𝜀. Second, given (𝑎, 𝑏), determine   from 
the following equation: 

𝑐′(𝑎)
𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑏)
+ 𝑝[ + 𝜙′( )] =  . 
This   is also independent of 𝜀. Third, given (𝑎, 𝑏,  ), find a contract 𝑠(⋅) satisfying the IR and 
the following equation: 
 𝑠′[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀 −  ] =
𝑐′(𝑎)
𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑏)
. 
Finally, we verify the SOCs.  
In the third step, let us try to find an optimal linear contract of the form 𝑠(𝑥) = 𝛼 + 𝜃𝑥, 
where 𝛼 and 𝜃 are two constants, 𝛼 ∈ ℝ and 𝜃 ∈ [0,  ]. By (34),   
 𝜃 =
𝑐′(𝑎)
𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑏)
. 
By the constraint in (32), we know that this 𝜃 is in (0,  ). Next, by the IR condition, this 𝛼 is 
defined by 

𝛼 = 𝐸{𝑐(𝑎) − ( − 𝑝) + 𝑝𝜙( ) − 𝜃[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀̃ −  ]}. 
This means that there is a linear contract that satisfies (34) and the IR condition. 
Finally, for this linear contract, we can easily verify the three SOCs. Hence, we have Prop-
osition 1. 
A.2. Lemma 1 
Lemma 1. Given 𝛾 ≤  , if the two inputs 𝑎 and 𝑏 are complementary, i.e., 𝑓𝑎𝑏(𝑎, 𝑏) ≥ 0, and 
𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) and 𝐶(𝑏) are twice differentiable, then problem (37) 
 
max
𝑎,𝑏
  𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) − 𝑐(𝑎) − 𝐶(𝑏)
  s.t.   𝑓𝑏(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝐶′(𝑏),
          ( − 𝛾)𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑐′(𝑎).
 (37) 
is equivalent to problem (38) 

max
𝑎,𝑏
  𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) − 𝑐(𝑎) − 𝐶(𝑏)
  s.t.   𝑓𝑏(𝑎, 𝑏) ≥ 𝐶′(𝑏),
          ( − 𝛾)𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑏) ≥ 𝑐′(𝑎).
 
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Proof. We need to show that, for any solution to (38), the two inequality constraints must be 
binding. If a solution (?̂?, ?̂?) of (38) satisfies 𝑓𝑏(?̂?, ?̂?) > 𝐶′(?̂?), by the continuity of 𝑓𝑏 and 𝐶′, we 
can find an 𝜀 > 0 such that  

𝑓𝑏(?̂?, ?̂? + 𝜀) ≥ 𝐶′(?̂? + 𝜀). 
Since 𝑎 and 𝑏 are complementary in production, the fact that 
( − 𝛾)𝑓𝑎(?̂?, ?̂?) ≥ 𝑐′(?̂?) 
implies that 
 ( − 𝛾)𝑓𝑎(?̂?, ?̂? + 𝜀) ≥ 𝑐′(?̂?). 
We know that, given ?̂?, the optimal 𝑏∗  that maximizes 𝜙(𝑏) ≡ 𝑓(?̂?, 𝑏) − 𝑐(?̂?) − 𝐶(𝑏) without 
any constraint satisfies condition 𝑓𝑏(?̂?, 𝑏
∗) = 𝐶′(𝑏∗). Since 𝜙(𝑏) is concave and is maximized at 
𝑏∗, 𝜙(𝑏) is increasing in [0, 𝑏∗] and decreasing in [𝑏∗, + ∞). With 𝑓𝑏(?̂?, ?̂?) > 𝐶′(?̂?) or 𝜙′(?̂?) > 0, 
as shown in the following figure, we have ?̂? ∈ [0, 𝑏∗).  
( )bf
b*bˆ bˆ e+
 
Figure 3. A Concave Curve 
Assume that ?̂? + 𝜀 ≤ 𝑏∗, which can be done by choosing a sufficiently small 𝜀 in (39). Hence, 
𝜙(?̂? + 𝜀) > 𝜙(?̂?). This means that (?̂?, ?̂? + 𝜀) satisfies the two conditions in (38), as shown in 
(39) and (40), and yields a higher value to problem (38). This contradicts the fact that (?̂?, ?̂?) is 
a solution to (38). Symmetrically, the second constraint must also be binding. This means that 
the more relaxed constraints in (38) do not improve the maximum value of 𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) − 𝑐(𝑎) −
𝐶(𝑏). Therefore, problems (37) and (38) are equivalent.  
A.3. Lemma 2 
Lemma 2. If a function 𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) is concave and strictly increasing, 𝑓𝑎𝑏(𝑎, 𝑏) ≥ 0, and 𝑐(𝑎) and 
𝐶(𝑏) are strictly convex, then, for any constant 𝐴 and increasing function 𝜑:ℝ → ℝ, the solu-
tion (𝑎∗, 𝑏∗) to the following equation system is strictly decreasing in 𝜀: 
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 { 
𝑓𝑏(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝐶′(𝑏),
{𝐴 − 𝜑[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀]}𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑐′(𝑎).
 (41) 
Proof: The equation system determines a pair (𝑎(𝜀), 𝑏(𝜀)). Taking the derivative with respect 
to 𝜀 on the equation system yields: 
𝑓𝑎𝑏(𝑎, 𝑏)𝑎′ + 𝑓𝑏𝑏(𝑎, 𝑏)𝑏′ = 𝐶′′(𝑏)𝑏′,
[𝐴 − 𝜑(𝑓 + 𝜀)][𝑓𝑎𝑎(𝑎, 𝑏)𝑎′ + 𝑓𝑎𝑏(𝑎, 𝑏)𝑏′] − (𝑓𝑎𝑎
′ + 𝑓𝑏𝑏
′ +  )𝜑′𝑓𝑎 = 𝑐′′(𝑎)𝑎′,
 
implying that 
(
𝑓𝑎𝑏 𝑓𝑏𝑏 − 𝐶′′(𝑏)
[𝐴 − 𝜑(𝑓 + 𝜀)]𝑓𝑎𝑎 − 𝑓𝑎
2𝜑′ − 𝑐′′(𝑎) [𝐴 − 𝜑(𝑓 + 𝜀)]𝑓𝑎𝑏 − 𝜑′𝑓𝑎𝑓𝑏
)(
𝑎′
𝑏′
) = (
0
𝜑′𝑓𝑎
), 
implying that 
(
𝑎′
𝑏′
) =
𝜑′𝑓𝑎
|
𝑓𝑎𝑏 𝑓𝑏𝑏 − 𝐶′′(𝑏)
[𝐴 − 𝜑(𝑓 + 𝜀)]𝑓𝑎𝑎 − (𝑓𝑎)
2𝜑′ − 𝑐′′(𝑎) [𝐴 − 𝜑(𝑓 + 𝜀)]𝑓𝑎𝑏 − 𝜑′𝑓𝑎𝑓𝑏
|
(
𝐶′′(𝑏) − 𝑓𝑏𝑏
𝑓𝑎𝑏
). 
We have 
     |
𝑓𝑎𝑏 𝑓𝑏𝑏 − 𝐶′′(𝑏)
[𝐴 − 𝜑(𝑓 + 𝜀)]𝑓𝑎𝑎 − 𝑓𝑎
2𝜑′ − 𝑐′′(𝑎) [𝐴 − 𝜑(𝑓 + 𝜀)]𝑓𝑎𝑏 − 𝜑′𝑓𝑎𝑓𝑏
|
= [𝐴 − 𝜑(𝑓 + 𝜀)](𝑓𝑎𝑏)
2
− 𝜑′𝑓𝑎𝑓𝑏𝑓𝑎𝑏 − {[𝐴 − 𝜑(𝑓 + 𝜀)]𝑓𝑎𝑎 − (𝑓𝑎)
2
𝜑′ − 𝑐′′(𝑎)}[𝑓𝑏𝑏 − 𝐶
′′(𝑏)]
= [𝐴 − 𝜑(𝑓 + 𝜀)][(𝑓𝑎𝑏)
2 − 𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑏𝑏] − 𝜑′𝑓𝑎𝑓𝑏𝑓𝑎𝑏 + [(𝑓𝑎)
2𝜑′ + 𝑐′′(𝑎)]𝑓𝑏𝑏
     +{[𝐴 − 𝜑(𝑓 + 𝜀)]𝑓𝑎𝑎 − (𝑓𝑎)
2𝜑′ − 𝑐′′(𝑎)}𝐶′′(𝑏) < 0,
 
where concavity of 𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) implies 
𝑓𝑎𝑎 ≤ 0,          𝑓𝑏𝑏 ≤ 0,          𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑏𝑏 − (𝑓𝑎𝑏)
2 ≥ 0, 
and the second equation of (41) implies 𝐴 − 𝜑(𝑓 + 𝜀) ≥ 0. Hence,  
∂𝑎
∂𝜀
< 0,        
∂𝑏
∂𝜀
≤ 0. 
A.4. Lemma 3 
Lemma 3. If a function 𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) is concave and strictly increasing, 𝑓𝑎𝑏(𝑎, 𝑏) ≥ 0, 𝑐(𝑎) and 
𝐶(𝑏) are strictly convex and 𝜙 is convex, given the fact that the manager will aim for the 
high pay in good times and 𝑥0 = 𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔, the manager will aim for the low pay in 
bad times.  
Proof: Given 𝑏𝑏,ℎ , if the manager aims for the high pay in bad times, her problem in bad times 
is 

max
𝑎,𝑧≥0
  𝑠ℎ − 𝑐(𝑎) + ( − 𝑝) − 𝑝𝜙( )
   s.t.   𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏𝑏,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑏 −  ≥ 𝑥0.
 
Consider the following equation: 
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𝑓𝑏(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝐶
′(𝑏), 
which determines 𝑏 as a function of 𝑎. From this equation, we find 
 
𝑑𝑏
𝑑𝑎
=
𝑓𝑎𝑏(𝑎, 𝑏)
𝐶′′(𝑏) − 𝑓𝑏𝑏(𝑎, 𝑏)
≥ 0. (43) 
If the constraint in (42) is nonbinding at its optimal, the derivative of the objective function 
with respect to 𝑎  is negative, implying 𝑎𝑏,ℎ = 0.  Since 𝑥0 = 𝑓(?̂?𝑔,ℎ , ?̂?𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔,  the inequality 
constraint in (42) becomes 
 𝑓(0, 𝑏𝑏,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑏 −  > 𝑓(?̂?𝑔,ℎ , ?̂?𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔 . (44) 
By (17), we have 𝑓𝑏(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) = 𝐶′(𝑏𝑔,ℎ) and 𝑓𝑏(𝑎𝑏,ℎ, 𝑏𝑏,ℎ) = 𝐶′(𝑏𝑏,ℎ). Since 𝑎𝑏,ℎ = 0 ≤ 𝑎𝑔,ℎ, by 
(43), we have 𝑏𝑔,ℎ ≥ 𝑏𝑏,ℎ. Since 𝜀𝑔 > 𝜀𝑏, the inequality in (44) in impossible.  
Hence, the constraint in (42) must be binding at its optimal, and the Nash equilibrium 
(𝑎𝑏,ℎ, 𝑏𝑏,ℎ) is determined by 

𝑓𝑏(𝑎𝑏,ℎ , 𝑏𝑏,ℎ) = 𝐶′(𝑏𝑏,ℎ),
( − 𝑝 − 𝑝𝜙′[𝑓(𝑎𝑏,ℎ , 𝑏𝑏,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑏 − 𝑥0])𝑓𝑎(𝑎𝑏,ℎ, 𝑏𝑏,ℎ) = 𝑐′(𝑎𝑏,ℎ),
 
where the first equation is from (17) and the second equation from (42). In contrast, from (23), 
the Nash equilibrium (𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) is determined by 

𝑓𝑏(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) = 𝐶′(𝑏𝑔,ℎ),
( − 𝑝 − 𝑝𝜙′[𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔 − 𝑥0])𝑓𝑎(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) = 𝑐′(𝑎𝑔,ℎ),
 
Comparing the solution (𝑎𝑏,ℎ , 𝑏𝑏,ℎ) from (45) with the solution (𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) from (46), since 𝜀𝑏 <
𝜀𝑔, Lemma 2 shows that (𝑎𝑏,ℎ , 𝑏𝑏,ℎ) < (𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ), implying 𝑓(𝑎𝑏,ℎ , 𝑏𝑏,ℎ) < 𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ). Given 𝑥0 
defined by 𝑥0 = 𝑓(?̂?𝑔,ℎ, ?̂?𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔, we find 
𝑓(𝑎𝑏,ℎ , 𝑏𝑏,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑏 < 𝑥0, 
implying that the manager does not receive the high pay since output is less than 𝑥0 in this 
case. This contradicts the assumption that the manager is aiming for the high pay. In fact, the 
manager will be aiming for the low pay in bad times. 
A.5. Proof of Proposition 2 
To solve the problem, we first drop  𝑔,ℎ and  𝑏,𝑙 from problem (23) since they are deter-
mined by 
 𝑔,ℎ = 𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔 − 𝑥0,        𝜙′( 𝑏,𝑙) =
 − 𝑝
𝑝
. 
Similarly, we can also drop 𝑎𝑏,𝑙 and 𝑏𝑏,𝑙. Then, problem (23) becomes 
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
max
𝑎𝑔,ℎ,𝑏𝑔,ℎ,𝑠𝑙,𝑠ℎ,𝑥0≥0
𝑊
             s.t.           𝑓𝑏(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) = 𝐶′(𝑏𝑔,ℎ),
                              
𝑐′(𝑎𝑔,ℎ)
𝑓𝑎(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ)
+ 𝑝{ + 𝜙′[𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔 − 𝑥0]} =  ,
                              𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔 − 𝑥0 ≥ 0,
                              IC condition (20),
                              IR condition (22).
 
Again, the IR condition must be binding. If not, we would be able to reduce 𝑠ℎ − 𝑠𝑙 by a tiny 
amount such that all conditions are satisfied but social welfare is increased, which is a contra-
diction. With the binding IR condition, we find 
𝑊 = 𝑞{𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) − 𝑠ℎ − ( − 𝑝) 𝑔,ℎ + 𝑝𝜙( 𝑔,ℎ) − 𝐶(𝑏𝑔,ℎ)}
          +( − 𝑞){𝑓(0, 𝑏𝑏,𝑙) − 𝑠𝑙 − ( − 𝑝) 𝑏,𝑙 + 𝑝𝜙( 𝑏,𝑙) − 𝐶(𝑏𝑏,𝑙)} + 𝜀̅
      = 𝑞{𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) − 𝑐(𝑎𝑔,ℎ) − 𝐶(𝑏𝑔,ℎ)}  + ( − 𝑞){𝑓(0, 𝑏𝑏,𝑙) − 𝐶(𝑏𝑏,𝑙)}
          −𝑞[𝑠ℎ − 𝑐(𝑎𝑔,ℎ) + ( − 𝑝) 𝑔,ℎ − 𝑝𝜙( 𝑔,ℎ)] − ( − 𝑞){𝑠𝑙 + ( − 𝑝) 𝑏,𝑙 − 𝑝𝜙( 𝑏,𝑙)} + 𝜀̅
      = 𝑞[𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) − 𝑐(𝑎𝑔,ℎ) − 𝐶(𝑏𝑔,ℎ)] + ( − 𝑞)[𝑓(0, 𝑏𝑏,𝑙) − 𝐶(𝑏𝑏,𝑙)] + 𝜀.̅
 
Then, the problem becomes 

max
𝑎𝑔,ℎ,𝑏𝑔,ℎ,𝑠𝑙,𝑠ℎ,𝑥0≥0
𝑞[𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) − 𝑐(𝑎𝑔,ℎ) − 𝐶(𝑏𝑔,ℎ)] + ( − 𝑞)[𝑓(0, 𝑏𝑏,𝑙) − 𝐶(𝑏𝑏,𝑙)] + 𝜀̅
             s.t.           𝑓𝑏(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) = 𝐶′(𝑏𝑔,ℎ),
                              
𝑐′(𝑎𝑔,ℎ)
𝑓𝑎(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ)
+ 𝑝{ + 𝜙′[𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔 − 𝑥0]} =  ,
                              𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔 − 𝑥0 ≥ 0,
                              IC condition (20),
                              IR condition (22).
 
Since 𝑠ℎ and 𝑠𝑙 are not part of the objective function of (47), we can drop 𝑠ℎ and 𝑠𝑙. We will 
also drop the IC and IR conditions; we will later choose 𝑠ℎ and 𝑠𝑙 to satisfy the IC and IR con-
ditions. Then, problem (47) becomes 

max
𝑎𝑔,ℎ,𝑏𝑔,ℎ,𝑥0≥0
𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) − 𝑐(𝑎𝑔,ℎ) − 𝐶(𝑏𝑔,ℎ)
         s.t.       𝑓𝑏(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) = 𝐶′(𝑏𝑔,ℎ),
                      
𝑐′(𝑎𝑔,ℎ)
𝑓𝑎(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ)
+ 𝑝{ + 𝜙′[𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔 − 𝑥0]} =  ,
                      𝑥0 ≤ 𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔.
 
By Lemma 1, problem (48) is equivalent to the following problem: 
max
𝑎𝑔,ℎ,𝑏𝑔,ℎ,𝑥0≥0
𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) − 𝑐(𝑎𝑔,ℎ) − 𝐶(𝑏𝑔,ℎ)
         s.t.       𝑓𝑏(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) ≥ 𝐶′(𝑏𝑔,ℎ),
                     ( − 𝑝{ + 𝜙′[𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔 − 𝑥0]})𝑓𝑎(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) ≥ 𝑐′(𝑎𝑔,ℎ),
                     𝑥0 ≤ 𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔.
 
Given 𝑥0, its Lagrange function is 
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𝐿 = 𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) − 𝑐(𝑎𝑔,ℎ) − 𝐶(𝑏𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜆[𝑓𝑏(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) − 𝐶′(𝑏𝑔,ℎ)]
        +𝜇[( − 𝑝{ + 𝜙′[𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔 − 𝑥0]})𝑓𝑎(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) − 𝑐′(𝑎𝑔,ℎ)],
 
where 𝜆 ≥ 0  and 𝜇 ≥ 0  are the Lagrange multipliers. Then, the FOCs for 𝑎𝑔,ℎ  and 𝑏𝑔,ℎ  are 
respectively 

0 =
∂𝐿
∂𝑎𝑔,ℎ
= 𝑓𝑎(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) − 𝑐′(𝑎𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜆𝑓𝑎𝑏(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ)
                        +𝜇 {−𝑝𝜙′′[𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔 − 𝑥0][𝑓𝑎(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ)]
2
− 𝑐′′(𝑎𝑔,ℎ)} ,
0 =
∂𝐿
∂𝑏𝑔,ℎ
= 𝑓𝑏(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) − 𝐶′(𝑏𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜆[𝑓𝑏𝑏(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) − 𝐶′′(𝑏𝑔,ℎ)]
                        +𝜇{−𝑝𝜙′′[𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔 − 𝑥0]𝑓𝑏(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ)𝑓𝑎(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ)}.
 
By the first constraint in (48), the second FOC in (49) implies that 
 
𝜆[𝑓𝑏𝑏(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) − 𝐶′′(𝑏𝑔,ℎ)]
+ 𝜇{−𝑝𝜙′′[𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔 − 𝑥0]𝑓𝑏(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ)𝑓𝑎(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ)} = 0. 
(50) 
This implies that, if 𝜇 = 0, we must have 𝜆 = 0. If so, the first FOC in (49) would imply that 
𝑓𝑎(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) = 𝑐′(𝑎𝑔,ℎ), 
which contradicts the second constraint in (47). Hence, we must have 𝜇 ≠ 0, i.e., 𝜇 > 0. Then, 
by (50) again, we have 𝜆 ≠ 0, i.e., 𝜆 > 0. By 𝜇 > 0, we find 
∂𝐿
∂𝑥0
= 𝜇𝑝𝜙′′[𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔 − 𝑥0]𝑓𝑎(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) > 0. 
Hence, the optimal 𝑥0 is 

𝑥0 = 𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔. 
Then, by (14),  ̂𝑔,ℎ = 0. After 𝑥0 is determined from (51), problem (48) becomes 
max
𝑎𝑔,ℎ,𝑏𝑔,ℎ
𝑓(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) − 𝑐(𝑎𝑔,ℎ) − 𝐶(𝑏𝑔,ℎ)
     s.t.   𝑓𝑏(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) = 𝐶′(𝑏𝑔,ℎ),
             
𝑐′(𝑎𝑔,ℎ)
𝑓𝑎(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ)
+ 𝑝[ + 𝜙′(0)] =  .
 
In this problem, the two constraints have already determined the solution, i.e., (?̂?𝑔,ℎ , ?̂?𝑔,ℎ) is 
the solution to the following equations: 
 𝑓𝑏(𝑎𝑔,ℎ , 𝑏𝑔,ℎ) = 𝐶′(𝑏𝑔,ℎ),          
𝑐′(𝑎𝑔,ℎ)
𝑓𝑎(𝑎𝑔,ℎ, 𝑏𝑔,ℎ)
+ 𝑝[ + 𝜙′(0)] =  . 
With this (?̂?𝑔,ℎ , ?̂?𝑔,ℎ), (51) then determines the optimal 𝑥0: 
 𝑥0 = 𝑓(?̂?𝑔,ℎ , ?̂?𝑔,ℎ) + 𝜀𝑔. 
Hence, the solution (?̂?𝑔,ℎ, ?̂?𝑔,ℎ , 𝑥0) of (48) is determined from (52)–(53). Note here that Lemma 
1 requires the following condition: 𝑝[ + 𝜙′(0)] ≤  .  
Finally, since  ̂𝑔,ℎ = 0, condition (20) becomes 
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
𝑠ℎ − 𝑠𝑙 ≥ ( − 𝑝) 𝑔,𝑙 − 𝑝𝜙( 𝑔,𝑙) + 𝑐(𝑎𝑔,ℎ). 
Also, the binding IR condition (22) becomes 
 ?̅? + ( − 𝑞)[( − 𝑝) 𝑏,𝑙 − 𝑝𝜙( 𝑏,𝑙)] − 𝑞𝑐(𝑎𝑔,ℎ) = 0. (55) 
We can easily find a pair of (𝑠ℎ, 𝑠𝑙) that satisfy (54) and (55). For example, we can arbitrarily 
find two numbers 𝑠0 and ∆ such that  
∆ ≥ ( − 𝑝) 𝑔,𝑙 − 𝑝𝜙( 𝑔,𝑙) + 𝑐(𝑎𝑔,ℎ),
𝑠0 = 𝑞𝑐(𝑎𝑔,ℎ) − ( − 𝑞)[( − 𝑝) 𝑏,𝑙 − 𝑝𝜙( 𝑏,𝑙)].
 
Then, define 
𝑠𝑙 = 𝑠0 − 𝑞∆,         𝑠ℎ = 𝑠0 + ( − 𝑞)∆. 
This pair will satisfy (54) and (55). Notice that by (12) we have  𝑏,𝑙 =  𝑔,𝑙; we can thus replace 
 𝑔,𝑙 in (54) by  𝑏,𝑙. Therefore, the optimal solution under central planning can be found and is 
summarized in Proposition 2. 
A.6. Proof of Proposition 3 
We have 𝑊∗ ≥ ?̂? if and only if 
𝜇1
2𝜇2
2 + 𝜇1
4 + 𝜇2
4
2(𝜇1
2 + 𝜇2
2)
≥
𝑞
2
( − 𝑝2)𝜇1
2 +
 
2
𝜇2
2, 
which is equivalent to 
𝜇1
2𝜇2
2 + 𝜇1
4 + 𝜇2
4 ≥ 𝑞( − 𝑝2)𝜇1
2(𝜇1
2 + 𝜇2
2) + 𝜇2
2(𝜇1
2 + 𝜇2
2), 
or 
𝜇1
4 ≥ 𝑞( − 𝑝2)𝜇1
2(𝜇1
2 + 𝜇2
2), 
or 
𝜇1
2 ≥ 𝑞( − 𝑝2)(𝜇1
2 + 𝜇2
2), 
or 
𝑞( − 𝑝2) ( + (
𝜇2
𝜇1
)
2
) ≤  , 
or  

𝜇2
𝜇1
≤ √
 
𝑞( − 𝑝2)
−  . 
This condition is likely to hold if 𝑞 is small, 𝑝 is large or 𝜇2/𝜇1 is small. That is, the market 
solution is better if the environment is risky, corruption is limited, or the role of the owner 
relative to the manager is minor. 
 
Part (a): Condition (56) is likely to hold if 𝑞 is small. More specifically, (56) holds if 
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𝑞 ≤
 
( − 𝑝2) ( + (
𝜇2
𝜇1
)
2
)
. 
  That is, the market solution is better if the environment is risky. 
 
Part (b): Condition (56) holds if 𝜇2/𝜇1 is small. Hence, the market solution is better if the 
role of the manager, as measured by 𝜇1/𝜇2, is important.  
 
Part (c): Condition (56) can be written as 

𝑝 ≥ √ −
 
𝑞 [ + (
𝜇2
𝜇1
)
2
]
 . 

This means that, if corruption can be effectively controlled such that (57) is satisfied, then the 
market solution is better. When 𝑞 is large enough such that 𝑞 [ + (
𝜇2
𝜇1
)
2
] ≥  , we can also find 
a 𝑝 ∈ [0,  ] such that (57) is satisfied. Hence, if the environment is not very risky, the market 
solution is always better if corruption can be properly controlled. In particular, if 𝑝 →  , (56) is 
always satisfied. 
 
Part (d): Following part (c), since √ −
1
𝑞[1+(𝜇2 𝜇1⁄ )2]
  is increasing in 𝑞, for a larger 𝑞, condi-
tion (57) requires a larger 𝑝. That is, the market solution requires that a safer environment (a 
larger 𝑞) be associated with more effective control of corruption (a larger 𝑝).   
A.7. The First Best 
If 𝑎, 𝑏 and   are all verifiable, we have the first-best problem, which is problem (31) with-
out the IC conditions and SOCs, i.e., 
max 
𝑎,𝑏,𝑧,𝑠(⋅)
𝐸[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀̃ − 𝑐(𝑎) − 𝐶(𝑏)]
     s.t.    𝐼𝑅:  𝐸{𝑠[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝜀̃ −  ] − 𝑐(𝑎) + ( − 𝑝) − 𝑝𝜙( )} = 0.
 
A solution to this problem is called a first-best solution; and correspondingly a solution to 
problem (31) is called a second-best solution. We use superscript ** to indicate the first-best 
solution.  
This problem can be solved in three steps. First, find (𝑎∗∗, 𝑏∗∗) from the following problem: 
max 
𝑎,𝑏
 𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) − 𝑐(𝑎) − 𝐶(𝑏). 
Hence, (𝑎∗∗, 𝑏∗∗) is determined from the following FOCs: 
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
𝑓𝑎(𝑎
∗∗, 𝑏∗∗) = 𝑐′(𝑎∗∗),         𝑓𝑏(𝑎
∗∗, 𝑏∗∗) = 𝐶′(𝑏∗∗). (58) 
Second, set  ∗∗ = 0. Third, simply choose a fixed contract 𝑠∗∗(𝑥) = 𝛼∗∗, where 𝛼∗∗ ∈ ℝ, to satis-
fy the IR condition.  
By comparing (58) with the constraint in problem (6), we know that the second-best solu-
tion is strictly inferior to the first best.  
For the parametric case in (25), the first-best solution is 
𝑎∗∗ = 𝜇1,         𝑏
∗∗ = 𝜇2,          
∗∗ = 0. 
Social welfare is 
 𝑊∗∗ =
𝜇1
2 + 𝜇2
2
2
. (59) 
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